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Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts:
An Analysis of RICO
Craig M. Bradley*
In enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO)1 -which is title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 (the Act)2 - Congress was motivated by extensive evidence leading
to the conclusion that organized crime was a "cancer in our cities," s
which would require strong measures to combat and eradicate. The
hearings that preceded the Act, including Joseph Valachi's startling
disclosures of the organization and scope of the Mafia,4 led to a nation-
wide fear that our society's basic institutions were being eroded by this
evil force. The popular reaction was not unlike the "red scares" that
swept the nation in the 1920s and again in the 1950s. 5
While the menace manifested by organized crime is certainly not a
chimera, the exact threat that it poses to democratic institutions and the
best way to deal with that threat are uncertain. What is certain is that,
by enacting RICO in an atmosphere of fear, Congress overreacted to the
problem with a statute that is overly broad. The courts, similarly moved
by the public alarm over organized crime, 6 have not only wholeheartedly
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. A.B.
1967, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1970, University of Virginia School of Law. The
Author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Eugene Gressman of the Univer-
sity of North Carolina School of Law, who suggested the need for research in this area,
and to Professors Roger Dworkin, Stanley Fickle, and Alex Tanford of Indiana Univer-
sity School of Law, for their extremely helpful comments and criticisms of earlier drafts
of this Article.
The author has served as an Assistant United States Attorney in Washington, D.C.,
and as a Senior Trial Attorney, Public Integrity Section, United States Department of
Justice. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not of the Department of
Justice.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). For the text of RICO, see Appendix.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
3. 111 CONG. REC. 4277 (1965) (message from President).
4. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm.
on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-83 (1963) (testimony of Joseph
Valachi).
5. In a case involving a member of the left-wing section of the Socialist Party, the
Supreme Court said that "his utterances were 'endangering the foundations of organized
government' and imperiling New York's 'existence as a constitutional State."' Chafee,
Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1952) (quoting
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925)). Chafee pointed out that in 1952 this
"red scare" was considered to have been exaggerated and suggested that the then cur-
rent red scare would be seen as similarly overblown in another thirty years. Id. at 6.
6. For example, in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court
declared:
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enforced this statute, but have in many cases expanded it far beyond the
congressional language and intent. 7 The broad language of RICO and
the judicial zeal in enforcing it have caused many individuals to be
prosecuted whom Congress clearly had no intention of reaching.8 Fur-
thermore, the failure of the courts to interpret this powerful statute nar-
rowly may ultimately defeat its purpose entirely by forcing the Supreme
Court to strike it down.
It is the purpose of this Article to analyze RICO carefully, section
by section, in an attempt to determine the congressional purpose,
whether that purpose is constitutionally permissible, and whether the
courts have accurately and constitutionally reflected that purpose in
their interpretations. The conclusion will be that Congress enacted an
unduly broad statute that could be largely cured by narrow judicial con-
struction. Far from construing the statute narrowly, however, the
courts, reflecting the national fear of racketeering, have extended RICO
beyond the broadest boundaries permitted by the statutory language,
thereby defeating the congressional intent and raising serious constitu-
tional questions.
I. HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
Beginning in the early 1950s, a national concern over the problem
of organized crime began to emerge. 9 A series of conferences'0 led to
federal legislation in 1961 prohibiting the promotion of gambling, nar-
In this case we deal with the question of whether and, if so, how a free
society can protect itself when groups of people, through division of labor,
specialization, diversification, complexity of organization, and the accumula-
tion of capital, turn crime into an ongoing business. Congress fired a telling
shot at organized crime when it passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1970, popularly known as RICO. Since the enactment of
RICO, the federal courts, guided by constitutional and legislative dictates,
have been responsible for perfecting the weapons in society's arsenal against
criminal confederacies.
Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
7. The court opinions reflect a patriotic zeal not to stop halfway when dealing with
such a grave problem. Thus, in United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977), the court, in adopting a very broad interpretation of RICO, made the following
observations:
Congress had no reason to adopt a constricted approach to the ... problem.
Congress was concerned with the infiltration of organized crime into the
American economy and to [sic] the devastating effects that racketeering activ-
ity had upon it. Yet, we are asked to believe that Congress' approach to a
monumental problem besetting the country was myopic and artificially con-
tained. Is it conceivable that in considering the ever more widespread tentacles
of organized crime in the nation's economic life, Congress intended to ignore
an important aspect of the economy . . . ? We think not.
Id. at 1090-91 (footnote omitted).
8. See notes 108, 110-11, 118-30 & 217-27 infra and accompanying text.
9. 115 CONG. REC. 5872-90 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
10. At the United States Conference of Mayors in 1950, some of the mayors reported
that organized crime had become so serious that individual localities were no longer able
to suppress it. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1951). The Attorney General's
Conference on Organized Crime was instrumental in the formation of the Special Coin-
RICO
cotics, and other criminal enterprises through interstate travel or the use
of interstate facilities." Attorney General Robert Kennedy made the
fight against organized crime a national priority and greatly expanded
the Justice Department staff devoted to the cause. 2 -Despite these
efforts, organized crime continued to flourish.' 3 The National Crime
Commission reported that one reason for the growth of organized crime
was the difficulty in proving cases against known organized crime figures
because of "defects in the evidence gathering process.'1 4 This led to the
introduction in the Senate of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1969.1 s The 1969 Act contained nine titles, providing, inter alia, for
special grand juries to investigate organized crime (title I), 16 means to
compel testimony from recalcitrant witnesses (titles II and III), 1 7 protec-
tion of witnesses (title VI), 18 and increased punishment for "organized
crime offenders" (title VIII). ' As originally proposed, the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1969 did not contain a provision comparable to
RICO.
mittee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. 115 CONG. REC. 5876
(1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). Other federal activity included the establishment of
the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section by the Justice Department in 1954 and
the formation of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and
Management Field, chaired by Senator McClellan. The Senate Select Committee's
investigations were continued by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Organized
Crime. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciary, S. 30, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 159-60 (1969); see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 10-24 (1967).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). Other legislation passed at the same time as part of
the Attorney General's program to combat organized crime includes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1073
(flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony), 1084 (transmission of wagering infor-
mation), 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia) (1976); and 15
U.S.C. § 901-909 (1976) (transportation of firearms), repealed by Act of June 19, 1968,
Pub. L. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 234.
12. See 116 CONG. Rc. 844-45 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
13. Between 1960 and 1969, the federal government was able to obtain only 235
indictments (involving 328 defendants), against the 5000 known members of the syndi-
cate. A study showed that members of the syndicate obtained dismissals or acquittals on
the charges against them more than twice as often as other defendants. Wilson, The
Threat of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal
Law, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 41, 44 (1970); see D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION
99-108 (1969).
14. 115 CONG. REC. 5877 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). Specifically, the Com-
mission found that under then present procedures too few witnesses were produced to
prove the link between criminal group members and the illicit activities they sponsored.
This situation was caused by the fear that organized crime induced in prospective wit-
nesses, the reluctance of some citizens to be an "informer," and the unwillingness of
some informants to testify publicly. Id.
15. Id. at 827. The bill was introduced by Senator McClellan, with Senators Hruska,
Allen, and Ervin as cosponsors. Id. at 832, 5877.
16. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-105 (1969) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3321-3330 (1976)).
17. Id. §§ 201-301 (current versions at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976); 28 id.
§ 1826).
18. Id. §§ 601-604 (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3481 (West Supp. 1979) (note
preceding)).
19. Id. § 801 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976)).
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The infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime was a
serious concern, which was not reflected in the 1969 Act. Four principal
methods by which organized crime gained control of legitimate busi-
nesses had been identified in 1967 by a presidential task force: investing
concealed profits acquired from gambling and other illegal enterprises;
accepting business interests in payment of the owner's gambling debts;
foreclosing on usurious loans; and using various forms of extortion. 20
The Task Force Report provided impetus for Congress to deal with the
infiltration of legitimate businesses, and in 1967 two bills were intro-
duced in the Senate on this subject. Both bills, however, were directed
at only one method of infiltration cited by the Report-investment. One
bill was designed to amend the Sherman Act by prohibiting the invest-
ment of certain unreported income in any business enterprise affecting
interstate or foreign commerce. 2' The other bill prohibited the invest-
ment of income derived from certain criminal activities in any business
enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 22 The Antitrust Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association agreed with the need for this type
of legislation, 23 but felt that the Sherman Act should not be amended.
Rather, the Antitrust Section asserted that a separate criminal provi-
sion, as in the latter bill, would more effectively deal with the
problem.24
20. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 4 (1967). An example of the use of
extortion was the attempted takeover of a New York juke box distribution firm. A
member of the syndicate demanded that the owner surrender one-fourth of the profits of
his firm, and in return, the syndicate would "protect" the owner. The owner refused,
and his wife was beaten and his daughter threatened. The syndicate members were
eventually convicted of an extortion plot. 115 CONG. REC. 23569 (1969).
21. As introduced by Senator Hruska, S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) made it
a violation of the antitrust laws to use in one business the intentionally and deliberately
unreported income derived from another business. The rationale for S. 2048 was the
belief that the evil to be curbed was the unfair competitive advantage inherent in the
large amounts of illicit income available to organized crime. 113 CONG. REc. 17997,
17999 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
22. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § - (1967). The criminal activities enumerated
were of the type normally associated with members of organized crime, such as gam-
bling, bribery, narcotics, and extortion. 113 CONG. REC. 17997 (1967). S. 2049, like title
IX as enacted, also authorized the issuance of injunctions at the request of either the
government or a private party, nationwide service of process, and private suits for treble
damages. It also granted immunity from prosecution to witnesses testifying in proceed-
ings instituted by the United States. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judi-
ctary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 555 (1969).
23. The Antitrust Section noted that some activities of organized crime in legitimate
business had already been reached by existing antitrust laws. See United States v. Bitz,
282 F.2d 465, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1960).
24. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
557 (1969) (report of Antitrust Section of ABA). The Report added that the use of anti-
trust laws as a vehicle for combating organized crime could create serious obstacles for
persons seeking treble damage recoveries because a very strict body of precedent exists in
the antitrust law on this type of suit. Id. at 558.
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These two bills died in committee, but on March 20, 1969, two
months after the introduction of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1969,25 Senators Hruska and Stevens introduced a replacement bill that
prohibited the investment of money derived from enumerated criminal
activities or the investment of any intentionally unreported income in
any enterprise affecting interstate commerce. 26 The bill also authorized
private suits for treble damages and injunctive relief. The Justice
Department criticized this bill because of its narrowness of scope in only
prohibiting investment, its failure to consider the control or operation of
a business by means of racketeering activities, its failure to provide for
forfeiture, and its failure to provide for civil investigative devices such as
the investigative demand. 27 Accordingly, a new bill (S. 1861) was intro-
duced as a final replacement. 2 This bill, to "prohibit the infiltration or
25. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
26. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6925 (1969).
27. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
387 (1969). Civil investigative demand is a term borrowed from antitrust law. The Jus-
tice Department is empowered under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1312-1314 (1976) to require parties
under investigation to produce evidence for examination prior to the institution of any
action.
28. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9512 (1969). One difference
between S. 1623 and S. 1861 is that S. 1623 refers to the infiltration of any business
while S. 1861 refers to the infiltration of legitimate organizations. Hearings on Measures
Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 61 (1969). The principal sec-
tions of S. 1861 provided:
"§ 1961. Definitions
"As used in this chapter-
"(1) The term 'racketeering activity' means (A) any act involving the
danger of violence to life, limb, or property, indictable under State or Federal
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under [enumerated provisions of title 18], and (C) any con-
spiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
"(2) The term 'interstate commerce' means commerce within the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the
United States, or between any place in a State and any place in another State,
or between places in the same State through another State.
"(3) The term 'State' means each of the several States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the
Canal Zone, and American Samoa.
"(4) The term 'person' includes any individual or entity capable of hold-
ing a legal or beneficial interest in property.
"(5) The term 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.
"(6) The term 'pattern of racketeering activity' includes at least one act
occurring after the efective date of this chapter.
"(7) The term 'unlawful debt' means a debt (A) which is unenforceable
under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest
because of the laws relating to gambling or usury, and (B) which was incurred
in connection with the business of gambling or the business of lending money
or a thing of value at a usurious rate.
"(8) The term 'racketeering order' means any final order, decree, or judg-
ment of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding
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management of legitimate organizations" by means of racketeering
activity as well as investment of the proceeds of racketeering activity in
such organizations, was the forerunner of the current Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. It included the remedy of divesti-
ture as well as provisions for a civil investigative demand. 29
In response to certain Justice Department suggestions,30 S. 1861 was
arising under this chapter.
"(9) The term 'racketeering investigation' means any inquiry conducted
by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any
person has been engaged in any racketeering violation.
"(10) The term 'racketeering violation' means any act or omission in viola-
tion of this chapter or any racketeering order hereunder.
"(11) The term 'racketeering investigator' means any attorney or investi-
gator employed by the Department of Justice who is charged with the duty of
enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter.
"(12) The term 'documentary material' includes the original or any copy
of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabula-
tion, chart, or other document.
§ 1962. Prohibited racketeering activities
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has knowingly received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern by racketeering activity
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds
of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful debt.
"(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. § 2, 115 CONG. REC. at 9569.
29. In commenting on the inadequacies of then current remedies, the President
observed that
[t]he arrest, conviction and imprisonment of a Mafia lieutenant can curtail
operations, but does not put the syndicate out of business. As long as the prop-
erty of organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place
of those we jail.
Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 449
(1969) (President's Message on Organized Crime). Private actions for damages were not
provided for in S. 1861; nor did S. 1861 include acts related to dealing in narcotics in its
definition of racketeering activity. These omissions were corrected later.
30. The Justice Department suggested that the definition of "racketeering activity"
be redefined in § 1961(a) to mean "any act or threat involAng murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, usury, or dealing in narcotic drugs, mari-
huana or other dangerous drugs, which is indictable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than I year." SENATE COMM. ON TIE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 122
(1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Their recommendation was followed in
the Senate Judiciary Committee's version of title IX, though the phrase "dealing in nar-
cotics or other dangerous drugs" was substituted for the phrase "dealing in narcotic
drugs, marijuana or other dangerous drugs." Id. at 21-22; Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1976)).
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amended somewhat and included as title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act,31 which passed the Senate on January 23, 1970, as the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The House version of the bill,
which adopted relatively minor revisions, 32 passed on October 7, 1970,
An amendment to § 1961(6) was offered to define "pattern of racketeering activity"
as requiring at least two acts of racketeering, rather than one act. SENATE REPORT,
supra, at 122. This amendment was adopted in the Senate Judiciary Committee's version
of title IX. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976); SENATE REPORT, supra at 22. Section 1962(a)
was criticized because it was not clear whether the prohibition against the investment of
certain types of income was aimed at the active participant in illegal enterprises or per-
sons who merely did business with such a participant, or both. Id. at 122. The Judiciary
Committee followed the Department of Justice's recommendation and amended §
1962(a) to include "in which such person has participated as a principal." Id. at 22, 23.
This indicates the narrow scope of the statute. The Justice Department also suggested
that the total ban on the acquisition of any interest in an enterprise provided in § 1962,
which included the acquisition of even one share of stock, was largely unnecessary. Id. at
123. The Department's suggestion was followed in title IX, which provided that the pur-
chase of securities that did not amount to one percent of the outstanding securities of
any one class was not unlawful. Id. at 23.
31. Other changes included changing the word "indictable" used in S. 1861,§ 1961(a) to the word "chargeable" in § 901(a) of title IX. SENATE REPORT, supra note
30, at 21. In § 1962(a) the term "knowingly" was eliminated. Id. at 22. The definition of
racketeering activity was expanded to include other acts indictable under provisions of
title 18. New provisions included § 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343 (wire fraud), § 1511
(obstruction of state or local law enforcement), § 1953 (interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia), and § 1955 (prohibition of illegal gambling businesses). Id. at
21. Section 901(a) of title IX added the phrase "[a]ny offense involving bankruptcy
fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the manufacture, importation, receiving, con-
cealment . ..or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs punishable
under any law of the United States" to the § 1961(d) definition of racketeering activity.
Id. at 22. A conspiracy subsection was added to § 1962, which read: "[I]t shall be
unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a),(b), or (c) of this section." Id. at 22. Subsection 1962(e) was added to provide that a
violation of § 1962 would continue so long as the person committing the violation con-
tinued to receive any benefit from it. Id. at 23.
32. The American Bar Association recommended amending title IX to allow private
actions for damages and § 1967 to give the court, in any proceedings instituted by the
United States under title IX, discretion to decide which proceedings should be open to
the public. Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. 30,
and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 559 (1970). For the adopted versions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1976); HOUSE COMM. ON THEJuDiciARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1970, H. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4034 and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976); HousE REPORT, supra,
at 16.
The Nevada Gaming Association objected on the ground that the definition of
unlawful debt turned not on whether the debt was incurred in illegal gambling activity,
but rather on whether the debt was unenforceable under state or federal law. While
gambling is legal in Nevada, gambling debts are not enforceable in civil actions. Las
Vegas Hacienda v. Gibson, 77 Nev. 25, 27, 359 P.2d 85, 86 (1961). Thus, licensed gam-
bling establishments that engaged in any collection activity or that invested the proceeds
of a gambling debt would violate § 1962 of S. 30. Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control of
Organized Crime in the United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 466 (1970) (statement of
Gaming Industry of Nevada). The section was revised to provide:
Unlawful debt means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity
which was in violation of the law of the United States, a state or political subdi-
vision thereof, or which is unenforceable under state or federal law . . .
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was approved by the Senate on October 12, and was signed into law by
the President on October 15, 1970.33
The criminal portion of RICO is divided into three sections (which
are set out in the Appendix to this Article): section 1961, which sets out
the definitions;3 4 section 1962, the operative section, which specifies
"prohibited activities"; s and section 1963, which provides criminal
penalties for violation of section 1962.36 The stated purpose of RICO is
"the elimination of infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into
legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.13 7 To accom-
plish this goal, three categories of activities are prohibited by section
1962:38 (1) subsection 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest funds derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in subsections 1961(1)
and (5), or derived from the collection of an unlawful debt as defined in
subsection 1961(6), in any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce; (2) subsection 1962(b) prohibits acquisition or maintenance
of an enterprise through the proscribed pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of an unlawful debt; (3) subsection 1962(c) prohibits the
conduct of the enterprise through the prohibited pattern of activity or
collection of debt. Subsection 1962(d) makes conspiracy to violate
subsections (a), (b), or (c) equally subject to the sanctions of the penalty
clauses. Thus, the three substantive sections prohibit, in essence, the
investment of "dirty" money by racketeers, the takeover or control of an
because of the laws relating to usery.
HOUSE REPORT, supra at 16.
The House version also omitted, without explanation, § 1962(e). See notes 22, 31
supra. The House version of title IX amended § 1961(1)(B) adding the phrase "if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious' to the reference to § 659 (relating to theft from
interstate shipment). HOUSE REPORT, supra at 16, [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 4032. Also, in § 1961(5), dealing with a "pattern of racketeering activity," the phrase
"[a]nd the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity" was added. Id. at 16,
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4032.
Two other amendments to title IX were offered on the floor of the House on October
7, 1970. Congressman Mikva suggested that persons who brought frivolous suits or suits
for the purpose of harassment under § 1964(c) should be subject to treble damages for
injury to the defendant. He said the amendment was necessary to protect innocent busi-
nessmen from competitors who would abuse § 1964(c) in order to do damage. The
amendment was rejected. 116 CONG. REC. 35342 (1970).
Congressman Biaggi offered an amendment that would have made it "unlawful for
any person to be a member of a Mafia or La Cosa Nostra organization." These organiza-
tions were defined so as to apply only to people of Italian ancestry. 116 CONG. REC.
35343 (1970). The constitutional soundness of the proposed amendment was questioned
in light of Supreme Court decisions such as Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The amendment was rejected. 116
CONG. REC. 35346 (1970).
33. 116 CONG. REC. 35340, 35347 (1970).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976), reproduced at Appendix infra.
35. See id. § 1962, reproduced at Appendix infra.
36. See id. § 1963, reproduced at Appendix infra.
37. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4007, 4033.
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interstate business through racketeering, and the operation of such a
business through racketeering.
Although RICO was aimed at organized crime, it encompasses a
wide range of criminal activities and consequently applies to many indi-
viduals who are not associated with any criminal organization. Congress
was well aware of this fact, but felt that unless the predicate acts were
defined broadly, they would not adequately cover the wide range of
activities dominated by organized crime.3 9 Still, the stated aim of RICO
is to prevent the takeover or use of legitimate businesses by organized
crime. There is no indication that RICO was designed to provide
increased penalties for racketeering activities, to forbid infiltration of
governmental agencies, or to greatly increase the scope of criminal con-
spiracy, yet it has been interpreted by the courts as doing all those
things. 40 The following analysis of the individual subsections will
attempt to demonstrate the intended scope of each part of RICO and
how the courts, in their fear of the menace of organized crime, have
gone far beyond what Congress intended.
II. SECTION 1961:41 ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE RICO DEFINITIONS
The key to understanding RICO is to understand the definitions.
Several terms that appear in the statute are not common in statutory
39. As Senator McClellan, the sponsor of the bill, explained:
The bar committee [of the City of New York] complains that the list is too
inclusive, since it includes offenses which often are committed by persons not
engaged in organized crime. The Senate report does not claim, however, that
the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of organized crime....
* * * It is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the
commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses com-
monly committed by persons outside organized crime as well ....
Title IX's list does all that can be expected ... it lists offenses com-
mitted by organized crime with substantial frequency, as part of its commercial
operations. The danger that commission of such offenses by other individuals
would subject them to proceedings under title IX is [small] .... Unless an
individual not only commits such a crime but engages in a pattern of such
violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an interest in an inter-
state business, he is not made subject to proceedings under title IX.
McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties, 46 N.D. LAw. 55, 142-44 (1970) (footnote omitted) (expansion of Senator
McClellan's remarks on Senate floor, see 116 CONG. REc. 18940 (1970)).
40. See notes 108-14, 118-30 & 216-31 infra and accompanying text.
41. Section 1961 provides, in pertinent part, the following definitions:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from inter-
state shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664
(relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
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usage and have caused the courts to break new ground in statutory
interpretation. This part of the Article will present the statutory defini-
tion of each significant term in light of any pertinent legislative
history.4 2 Then, through an analysis of frequently conflicting court deci-
sions, an attempt will be made to interpret the definitions of RICO in a
way that most accurately reflects the congressional intent, as necessarily
limited by applicable constitutional provisions.
A. Subsection 1961(1): Racketeering Activity
"Racketeering activity" is defined in subsection 1961(1) as:
(A) any act or threat involving [enumerated offenses] which
is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1034 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section
1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section
1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transporta-
tion of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling
businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which
is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States;
(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the
United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instru-
mentality thereof;
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associ-
ation, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racke-
teering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter
and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling
activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or politi-
cal subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in
whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury,
and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in
violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision
thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious
under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the
enforceable rate.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1979).
42. See text accompanying notes 43-170 infra.
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for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
[enumerated] provisions of title 18, United States Code ... ;
(C) any act which is indictable under [the enumerated provi-
sions of] title 29, United States Code .. . .or (D) any offense
involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or
[enumerated narcotics offenses] punishable under any law of
the United States. 43
In the original bill (S. 1861) subsection (1)(A) defined racketeering
activity as "any act involving danger of violence to life, limb, or property
indictable under State or Federal law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year. '44 The Justice Department asserted that this
definition was "too broad and would result in a large number of unin-
tended applications as well as tending toward a complete federalization
of criminal justice." 45 Accordingly, the Justice Department recommended
a change in what is now subsection 1961(1)(A) to roughly its present
form46 in which a series of specific offenses are enumerated.4 7
Although it is now fairly clear which offenses are to be included
within the term "racketeering activity, s48 Congress left unclear the
meaning of the terms "chargeable under State law" in subsection
1961(1)(A) and "indictable under [enumerated] provisions of Title 18
United States Code" in subsection 1961(l)(B). One major question has
been litigated:4 9 whether the pattern offenses"0 must have been "charge-
able" (or indictable) at the time they were committed, 51 at the time of
43. 18 U.S.c. § 1961(1) (1976).
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 121 (letter from Kleindienst to
McClellan); note 30 supra.
45. Id. at 121-22.
46. The Justice Department later added "dealing in . . .marijuana" as one of the
specifically covered offenses and used "indictable" where "chargeable" appears in the
final version. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30.
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1979), reproduced at Appendix infra.
48. The difficulties in applying the provisions of §§ 1962(a), (b), and/or (c) to cer-
tain predicate offenses will be a recurring theme of this Article.
49. Another issue, which has not been the subject of litigation, is raised by the use of
the term "chargeable" when referring to state law violations and the term "indictable"
when referring to federal law violations. The legislative history is silent as to the reason
for the choice of differing provisions. The only reason that seems likely is that, because
the specific federal offenses were all known to be indictable, the more precise term was
applied to them. Because the state offenses were stated generically, the use of the lan-
guage "chargeable" and "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year" encom-
passed all offenses that under federal law would have been indictable felonies, but that
under the procedures of a particular state might be indictable or designated as felonies.
Thus, the term "chargeable" was apparently chosen to ensure that a defendant would
not escape punishment because of a technicality of a particular state's law, and the two
terms seem to have the same meaning. See United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065,
1066-67 (3d Cir. 1978); cf United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 859-60 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977) (concluding that Congress made a mistake in using "indict-
able" as applied to the federal offenses).
50. A "pattern offense" is one of the offenses enumerated in the subsections of
RICO, which make up the "pattern of racketeering activity."
51. See notes 53-59 infra and accompanying text.
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the RICO indictment, 52 or, as this Article suggests, at the time the
RICO violation was completed.5 3
It has been argued that if the statute of limitations on the pattern
offenses expired prior to the RICO indictment, the offenses may not still
be considered "chargeable" or "indictable" for the purpose of con-
stituting "racketeering activity" under the RICO definition. In United
States v. Forsythe"' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit con-
sidered a case in which the state two-year statute of limitations had
expired on the pattern offense prior to the RICO indictment. 55 The
court held that the five-year federal statute of limitations was applicable
to the pattern offense because the state law offenses were not the
"gravamen" of RICO, but were merely included for definitional pur-
poses.56 The Third Circuit claimed to reaffirm Forsythe in United States
v. Davis,57 which presented the same issue: whether the words "'charge-
able under State law' .. mean 'chargeable under State law at the time
the [state] offense was committed,' "s or whether the state offense must
still be chargeable at the time of the RICO indictment. The Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the requirements of RICO were satisfied by a state
law offense that was chargeable at the time it was committed. 59
An alternative interpretation, adopted by Judge Aldisert concur-
ring in Davis, is that "chargeable" means that the offense must be
chargeable at the time of the RICO indictment.6 0 Judge Aldisert
accused the majority of "statutory construction in the . . .fabricating
sense" for overlooking the plain language of the statute, which pertains
to an offense that "is chargeable" under state law.6'
52. See text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 66-71 infra.
54. 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 1134.
56. Id. at 1134-35. The court concluded that the elimination of a proposed
§ 1962(e) from RICO was significant. Section 1962(e) would have provided that a RICO
offense would continue so long as the person committing it received any benefits from
the violation. The unexplained elimination of this provision from the final bill led the
court to conclude that § 3282 was applicable to the state law pattern offenses. Id. at
1134.
57. 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1978); accord, United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp.
189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 692-93 (5th
Cir. 1977) (quoting Forsythe with approval in slightly different context); text accompa-
nying notes 165-70 infra.
58. 576 F.2d at 1067.
59. Id. If, as it appeared, Forsythe applied a five-year statute of limitations to the
predicate state offenses, Davis overruled Forsythe; the court in Davis did not reaffirm
Forsythe, as the court claimed to do. If the only requirement is that the state law
offenses had been chargeable at the time they were committed, as Davis holds, it is irrele-
vant how much time has passed between the state law offense and the RICO indictment.
The only pertinent statute of limitations question is how much time has passed since the
proceeds of racketeering activity were invested (§ 1962(a)), since an enterprise was
acquired through racketeering activity (§ 1962(b)), etc. The question, in short, is how
much time has passed since the RICO offense was completed.
60. Id. at 1068 (Aldisert, J., concurring). See also United States v. Frumento, 563
F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir. 1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
61. 576 F.2d at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
RICO
A reading of the statute in its entirety is instructive. The juxtaposi-
tion of subsections 1961(1)(a) and 1962(c), as applied in Davis (which
involved bribery charges under Pennsylvania law), 62 provides in effect
that it shall be unlawful for any person to conduct the affairs of an
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through two or more acts of
bribery that are chargeable under state law. 63 As Judge Aldisert noted,
if Congress had wanted to refer to conduct chargeable at the time of the
offense, it could have said so explicitly, namely: two or more acts of
bribery that were chargeable under state law at the time they were com-
mitted.6 4 It can be even more strongly argued that the statutory provi-
sion is at least unclear and, applying the rule of lenity,65 should be
construed in favor of the defendant.
Actually, the most satisfactory reading of the statute is a middle
ground. The use of the present tense ("is chargeable") language in
subsection 1961(1) could be read, as Judge Aldisert suggests, to refer to
"chargeable" at the time of the RICO indictment, or it could be read to
refer to "chargeable" at the time the defendant completed the violation
of RICO .66 This latter view would seem to reflect Congress' legitimate
concern: determining defendants' status at the time they commit the
additional act that constitutes a violation of federal law. If the defend-
ants have been acquitted of a state law extortion offense before they use
money from that alleged extortion to take over an interstate business,
they cannot be convicted of a subsection 1962(a)6 7 RICO violation. 68
62. Id. at 1066.
63. Id. at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Aldisert, J., concurring). Consider also, §§ 1961(1)(A) and 1962(a), similarly
parsed: "it shall be unlawful for any person who has received any money from two or
more bribery offenses that are chargeable under state law, to invest such money .......
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
65. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
66. 576 F.2d at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
67. Section 1962(a) forbids the investment of the proceeds of racketeering activity in
an enterprise that affects interstate commerce.
68. This problem cannot arise under § 1962(b)-(c) because the RICO violation and
the state law violation must by definition occur simultaneously. Thus, RICO is violated
only "through" a pattern of state law violations. Section 1962(a), by contrast, requires
first a state law violation and then certain additional acts that constitute the RICO
offense. The potential defendants therefore have an opportunity to contemplate whether
or not their proposed course of conduct- investing in an enterprise-is illegal. The
argument that Congress did not intend RICO to apply to individuals no longer charge-
able at the time they invest in an "enterprise" is bolstered by due process considerations.
How are the defendants to determine that the federal government considers them
"chargeable" for state offenses for which they were acquitted? It is like requiring a doc-
tor, on pain of criminal prosecution, to determine whether "there is sufficient reason to
believe that the fetus may be viable," a statutory provision struck down in Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391-93 (1979).
Similar to the statute in Colautti, RICO "fails to give a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." Id. at 683
(quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). Indeed, potential RICO
violators are treated even more unfairly because they have received an authoritative
opinion from the state authorities that they are not chargeable with a state offense.
Thus, the view of the Third Circuit in Davis raises serious constitutional problems. On
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They were not "chargeable" with any state law offense at the time of the
RICO violation.
The view that RICO was not designed to be limited to offenses
chargeable at the time of the RICO indictment (contrary to Judge
Aldisert's contention) is bolstered by a consideration of subsection
1961(5), which provides that the
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity. 69
If it were intended that no criminal act on which the statute of limita-
tions had expired at the time of the RICO indictment could be part of
the pattern, the ten-year provision in this subsection would be largely
meaningless. The five-year federal statute of limitations and the statutes
for most state crimes would require the pattern acts to have occurred
within five years or less of the RICO indictment-a result exactly con-
trary to the purpose of subsection 1961(5). Thus, it must be concluded
that Congress meant that defendants could be prosecuted under RICO
if they were chargeable with two or more pattern offenses at the time
they committed the other elements of the RICO violation.
Since RICO requires the commission of an additional act-such as
investing in an enterprise or taking over an enterprise -beyond the pat-
tern offenses, it follows that a prior acquittal of the pattern offenses does
not bar a RICO prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. 70 The jury in
the RICO case must find only that the defendants were chargeable with
the other hand, if the defendants commit the state law violation and invest the money(in violation of § 1962(a) of RICO) before their state court acquittal, the RICO jury can
easily find that, despite their subsequent acquittal, the defendants were "chargeable"
under state law at the time of the RICO offense, and they therefore violated § 1962(a).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
70. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). This was the view of the
Third Circuit in United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, the court based its decision on the dual sovereignty doctrine of Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959).
Abbate is not applicable here because the availability of a RICO charge after acquit-
tal of the state pattern offenses does not depend on dual sovereignty, rather, it depends
on the fact that RICO requires additional conduct beyond that required to violate state
law. It is not, as in Abbate, a reprosecution of essentially the same offense in another
forum. It is a completely independent charge. Thus, even if, as Judge Aldisert posited,
in Frumento, 563 F.2d at 1099 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court were to
overrule Abbate, the result in Frumento should be the same-a state court acquittal of
the pattern offenses does not bar a subsequent RICO conviction unless the acquittal
occurred before the RICO violation was committed.
Similarly, a prior acquittal of federal pattern offenses would not necessarily bar a
RICO prosecution or conviction, though the collateral estoppel principle of Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 441-45 (1970), would normally render such a charge impossible
to establish. See United States v. Frumento, 409 F. Supp. 136, 141 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977).
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the predicate offenses at the time they committed the RICO violation."
B. Subsection 1961(4): Enterprise
RICO explicitly prohibits investing racketeering money or money
derived through collection of an unlawful debt in an "enterprise" that is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate conmnerce; 72 it
also prohibits the acquisition or operation of such an "enterprise"
through a pattern of racketeering activities or through collection of an
unlawful debt. 73 Subsection 1961(4), which remains unchanged from its
original form in S. 1861, 74 provides that "'enterprise' includes any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, or
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity. ' 75 Two questions have been raised in the courts of appeals con-
cerning the scope of this definition: First, is the enterprise limited to
legitimate businesses or can the enterprise that is affected by the
racketeering activity be an illegal enterprise?76 For example, if
racketeers operate an illegal gambling business through a pattern of
racketeering activities, can they be prosecuted under RICO? Second,
can the enterprise be a governmental agency, such as a police depart-
ment?77
1. Legitimate or Illegitimate "Enterprises"
At first glance, the definition of enterprise would appear to
embrace an illegal as well as a legal enterprise. An illegal gambling
operation, for instance, would be a "group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.' '78 This language has led the courts of
appeals that have considered the issue to conclude, with one recent
71. While it may be argued that a finding that they were "chargeable" does not
necessarily amount to a finding that they "committed" the predicate offenses, this is
apparently what Congress intended and, though the issue has not been raised, is the
meaning the courts have attributed to the statute. Thus, in United States v. Frumento,
409 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), the court found
that RICO "requires a showing of at least two separate instances of racketeering
activity." Id. at 139. The issue has never been specifically discussed, but the
government's proof in every case is to the effect that defendants actually committed the
pattern crimes.
This view is consistent with legislative history. The Senate Report stated: "A 'racke-
teering activity' . . . must be an act in itself subject to criminal sanction and any pro-
scribed act in the pattern must violate an independent statute." See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 35, at 158.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
73. Id. § 1962(b).
74. Compare S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1969) with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1976).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
76. See notes 78-114 infra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 115-32 infra and accompanying text.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
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exception,7 9 that the statute does cover illegal as well as legal enter-
prises, 8° a view that conflicts sharply with the legislative history. 8'
While a statement of congressional purpose is not necessarily dis-
positive,82 it nevertheless is instructive. Congress was very explicit about
the purpose of RICO: "the elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
state commerce. 8 3 Despite this clear statement of congressional intent,
the first court of appeals to consider the issue, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, found in United States v. Cappetto"4 that "[b]oth
the statutory language and the legislative history" supported the notion
that "enterprise" included illegitimate as well as legitimate concerns.8 5
However, the only legislative history cited in support of this assertion is a
statement from the Senate Report that
[a] more effective effort must be mounted to eliminate illegal
79. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1979). See also United States
v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 574 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting); United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977); Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pur-
suit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109, 114 (1979); Comment,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Crimi-
nal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 201 (1975). In Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770 (1975), the Supreme Court, in dictum, recognized the more limited scope of the
statute. Id. at 787 n.19.
80. Four circuits and one district court in another circuit have concluded that an
illegal enterprise is included in this definition. See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564,
568 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp.
189, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
81. See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 266-69 (6th Cir. 1979); text accom-
panying notes 82-101 infra.
82. The statute may, by its language, perform an additional function beyond the
stated purpose. On the other hand, "[i]f an absolutely literal reading of a statutory pro-
vision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a less literal construc-
tion must be considered." United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971).
83. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76 (emphasis added). Similarly, the section
analysis states: "Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at the infiltration
of legitimate organizations." Id. at 159. The language of the House Report is identical.
See H.R. REP. No. 15499, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws, 4007, 4033. Indeed, the original bill (S. 1861) was called: "A bill . . . to
prohibit the infiltration or management of legitimate organizations by racketeering activ-
ity .... " 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969). Every pertinent reference to the bill in congres-
sional reports or debate declares that the purpose of the bill was to prevent infiltration of
legitimate business. For a summary of legislative intent, see United States v. Moeller, 402
F. Supp. 49, 58-59 n.8 (D. Conn. 1975).
In fact, at the time the bill was pending, the Justice Department believed it only
applied to legitimate organizations. Commenting on the bill at the Senate Hearings,
Assistant Attorney General Wilson described it as "designed to attack the infiltration of
legitimate business by organized crime." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedure of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 387
(1969).
84. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 1358.
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gambling. In that effort the Federal Government must be able
not only to deny the use and facilities of interstate commerce
to the day-to-day operations of illegal gamblers-as it can do
under existing statutes-but also to prohibit directly the sub-
stantial business enterprises of gambling . ... 86
The quoted language indicates a congressional intent to prohibit directly
the business of gambling. What the court failed to point out is that the
quoted language does not deal with RICO (title IX) at all, but rather
with title VIII,8 7 in which Congress specifically prohibited the business
of gambling.88 Thus, the court in Cappetto incorrectly attributed the
legislative history of title VIII to RICO and thereby construed the
subsection 1961(4) definition of enterprise as including both legal and
illegal organizations.
The courts of appeals of other circuits that subsequently considered
the issue relied on Cappetto in reaching, without extended discussion,
the same conclusion.8 9 More significantly, the other courts did not
require more than a serieg of unconnected illegal acts to find that an
enterprise existed.90 In defining the enterprise in this way, the courts
86. Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 73).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976) provides that "[w]hoever conducts, finances, man-
ages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined
not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." This statute
represents a departure from prior federal law, which had never forbade gambling opera-
tions per se, but had prohibited the use of interstate facilities in connection with gam-
bling.
The court in Cappetto further evidenced its misunderstanding of the statute by con-
ceding that § 1962(a) was only designed to deal with legal enterprises, while §§ 1962(b)
and (c) were designed to deal with both legal and illegal enterprises. See 502 F.2d at
1358. To the contrary, whatever the scope of the term "enterprise," it is clear that it is
the same in all three subsections, because the term, as defined in § 1961(4), is applied to
§§ 1962(a), (b), and (c).
89. See cases cited at note 90 infra.
90. In United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975), a civil forfeiture case under § 1964 involving an illegal gambling busi-
ness, the pattern offenses were "participating ... in an illegal gambling business viola-
tive of Section 1955." Id. at 1355. The same was true in United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104, 105 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). In United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the enterprise was simply a series of four
bribes paid to the defendant (a legislator) by coconspirators from the parents of students
who wanted the defendant to use his influence to have their children admitted to
graduate schools in the state. These same bribes were the pattern offenses. Id. at 192.
In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978), the enterprise was nothing more than a series of illegal acts performed by a large
number of individuals who knew each other and associated in various combinations to
perform their illegal deeds, but were not formally or informally connected in any sort of
organization. Id. at 884-87; see text accompanying notes 217-31 infra. Similarly, in
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), the enterprise was a series of three
murders and two extortions committed by two unrelated individuals. Id. at 566. See also
United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1020 (1978); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1976).
All of these cases used the pattern offenses to define the enterprise. And, with the
exception of the gambling cases, only a series of crimes was involved; there was no enter-
prise in the usual sense of the word.
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have tacitly made an additional finding that the enterprise can be defined
by reference to the pattern crimes themselves. For example, in United
States v. Altese9" and in Cappetto92 the courts initially found a series of
gambling violations and then held that proof of those same violations
established the existence of an enterprise. 93 Thus, operation of an illegal
gambling enterprise that necessarily involves committing a "pattern" of
gambling violations would give rise to prosecution for the gambling
violations themselves, as well as to prosecution under RICO. In United
States v. Elliott94 and in United States v. Rone95 there was no "business"
at all-nothing more than a series of essentially unrelated pattern
offenses was used to define the enterprise. 96 Thus, the courts have read
the enterprise element out of the statute; in their view, a pattern of
racketeering activities is the enterprise.
Finally, in United States v. Sutton97 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit recognized that the other courts, perhaps more influenced
by their hostile attitude toward racketeers than by a common sense
reading of the statute, had, in effect, eliminated the enterprise element
by defining the enterprise solely in terms of the pattern crimes. 98 The
Sixth Circuit's solution to the problem in Sutton was to conclude that
the enterprise must be something more than, and separate from, the
pattern crimes. 99 The court reasoned:
Surely, the draftsmen would not have opted for so complex a
formulation if the legislative purpose had been merely to pro-
scribe racketeering, without more. A straight-forward prohibi-
tion against engaging in "patterns of racketeering activity"
would have sufficed and there would have been no need for
reference to "enterprises" of any sort. °'
However, the Sixth Circuit concluded that enterprise is limited to
entities that are "organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful pur-
pose." 101 This goes too far. While it is in keeping with the congressional
purpose as stated in the legislative history, it is not mandated by the
words of the statute. If a loan shark uses the profits of the loan-sharking
activity to buy an illegal gambling enterprise, the enterprise has an inde-
pendent existence from the racketeering activity, and RICO can appro-
priately be enforced without reading the term enterprise out of the
statute. That is, the government can show, as the statute requires, that
91. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
92. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
93. 542 F.2d at 106-07; 502 F.2d at 1358.
94. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
95. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 568; 571 F.2d at 898-99.
97. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
98. Id. at 265.
99. Id. at 266.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 270.
RICO
the defendant has invested income derived from racketeering activity into
a gambling enterprise that affects interstate commerce in violation of
subsection 1962(a). Nothing in the language of the statute requires that
the enterprise be "ostensibly legitimate" as the Sixth Circuit requires
and as the legislative history suggests. 1'0 On the other hand, to allow a
RICO prosecution to arise out of the simple operation of a gambling
business with no showing that some separate enterprise is being acquired
or operated "through" the gambling activities (as the majority of the
courts have done) defies both the language and the legislative history of
RICO.
Not only has the majority view expanded RICO beyond the con-
gressional intent, it also has created problems under the double jeopardy
clause. A concrete example will illustrate why this is true. Suppose five
persons conduct a gambling operation that acquires $2000 on a given
day. This operation would thereby violate 18 U.S.C. § 1955.103 It would
also, by the definition in section 1955, violate state gambling laws. Once
this is determined, a RICO violation has also, automatically, been
established if the court accepts the majority view that the gambling
operation can be the enterprise. That is, the defendants have conducted
or participated in a gambling enterprise that affects interstate com-
merce 104 through a pattern of two gambling offenses (one state, one
federal) in violation of subsection 1962(c). Since, under the rule of
Abbate v. United States, 0 5 the two gambling offenses may be con-
sidered separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes, 10 6 it follows that
they may be separate crimes for the purposes of establishing the neces-
sary two RICO pattern offenses. Thus, commission of a section 1955
violation, without more, is also a RICO offense, in violation of the dou-
ble jeopardy clause as explicated in Blockburger v. United States.0 7 The
RICO charge, in effect, reads: Defendant has conducted the affairs of a
gambling enterprise that affects interstate commerce through a pattern
of conducting a gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and
of gambling in violation of state law. This is a meaningless rendition of
102. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976) provides that whoever conducts an illegal gambling
business shall be fined, etc. "Illegal gambling business" is defined as a gambling business
that (1) is in violation of state law, (2) involves five or more persons who conduct,
finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of the business, and (3) has a gross
revenue of $2000 in any single day or operates continuously for over 30 days. Id.
§ 1955(b).
104. Congressional findings have established that such gambling operations auto-
matically affect interstate commerce, thereby satisfying § 1955. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 30, at 16. Indeed, any of the federal pattern offenses will satisfy this element, thus
effectively reading it out of the statute as well.
105. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
106. Id. at 195-96.
107. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The test is "whether each provision requires proof of a
fact wich the other does not." Id. While RICO appears to require proof of facts that
§ 1955 does not require, it does not do so if enterprise is defined by reference to the pat-
tern offenses.
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the statute that turns a five-year felony under section 1955 into a
twenty-year felony under RICO with proof of no additional facts, which
clearly violates Blockburger.
A similar analysis can be applied to any of the federal violations
enumerated in subsection 1961(1)(B), which also violate the state laws
enumerated in subsection 1961(1)(A), including bribery, extortion, and
narcotic offenses. Even when two federal violations form the pattern
(such as two separate violations of section 1955), the result goes beyond
the congressional purpose, although it does not technically create dou-
ble jeopardy problems. Thus, if the gambling operation commits two
section 1955 violations, it has also automatically violated subsection
1962(c), because the gambling enterprise has been "operated through a
pattern" of gambling activity. It defies reason to suppose that Con-
gress, without saying so, created RICO to punish two gambling offenses
with an additional twenty years of imprisonment where one such offense
would result in only a five-year imprisonment. To the contrary, the
obvious purpose of RICO was to prevent gamblers from branching out
into other activities, not to punish them additionally for operating a
gambling business "through a pattern" of gambling activities.
1 0 8
The use of the pattern offenses as the enterprise has the additional
result of extending RICO to cover offenses in which Congress specifically
disclaimed any interest. For instance, Congress dealt only with large-
scale gambling in section 1955, intending to leave so-called "mom and
pop"10 9 gambling to the states. But since RICO also embraces gambling
108. The problem is even more acute for the offender when other pattern offenses are
considered. For instance, in Indiana a person who "knowingly engages in bookmaking" is
guilty of a felony. IND. CODE § 35-45-5-3 (Supp. 1978). While it is obviously possible to
commit but a single act of bookmaking, it is hard to imagine a bookmaker being
arrested without having committed a series of such acts. Any two such acts that are
chargeable under state law (and subject to two years imprisonment each) would thus
define a "pattern of racketeering activity" and an "enterprise," see 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1976), and the government would need only to show some affect on interstate com-
merce to turn a relatively minor state law violation into a 20-year federal felony.
Because some effect on interstate commerce can be shovm in even the most localized
gambling operation, see, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 241-42 (1972)
(purchase of Illinois Sports News-scratch sheet-by Indiana bookmaker enough to
establish interstate element of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970)), the reach of RICO has been
extended, despite an express disclaimer by Congress, see note 109 infra, to cover every
two-bit bookmaker and numbers runner who can be shown to be chargeable with two
such offenses.
Similarly, any two acts of uttering counterfeit money, 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976), or two
mailings in a mail fraud scheme, id. § 1341, would automatically activate RICO, despite
the fact that no mail fraud or counterfeit scheme ever consists of only a single uttering or
mailing. RICO thus serves as a device for pyramiding penalties rather than for prohibit-
ing any substantive wrongful behavior.
109. See 116 CONG. REC. 18938-39 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (responding to
criticisms of broad reach of S. 30).
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prohibited by state law, if the "mom and pop" operation is considered
an enterprise under RICO, two violations of state gambling laws become
subject to federal prosecution and penalties of twenty years and a
$25,000 fine.110 By holding that the RICO enterprise can be an illegal
gambling operation prohibited by state law, the courts have "overruled"
Congress.
When the "unlawful debt" provisions of section 1962 of RICO are
considered,"' additional double jeopardy problems arise. Suppose an
individual is a loan shark in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894. If the
enterprise requirement of RICO is satisfied by the loan-sharking opera-
tion itself, any violation of section 894 Will automatically result in a
violation of subsection 1962(c) as well, 112 since it is essentially impossible
to violate section 894 by any other means than "through the collection of
an unlawful debt." If so applied, the RICO statute would become a
tautology that fails to satisfy the Blockburger test and therefore violates
the double jeopardy clause-establishing a RICO violation would not
require proof of a fact in addition to the facts required to prove a sec-
tion 894 violation. Obviously, the purpose of RICO was not to deal with
loan-sharking or gambling activities themselves, since those activities are
forbidden by other statutes, but rather to prevent the loan sharks or
gamblers from branching out into other businesses.11 3 In order to avoid
double jeopardy problems and to effectuate the congressional purpose,
110. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). Of course, RICO was designed to pro-
hibit certain activities by "mom and pop," but not their gambling business itself. If, for
example, "mom and pop" use their gambling profits to buy into another business that
affects interstate commerce, they would violate § 1962(a).
111. The RICO prohibitions apply to a "pattern of racketeering activity" or to a
single "collection of an unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
112. The interstate commerce requirement would be satisfied by congressional find-
ings, as to 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (1976), that loan-sharking affects interstate commerce.
See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971).
113. Most of the problems raised above are avoided if the enterprise, though illegal, is
a different business from the pattern activities. Thus, to consider a gambler's investment
in a loan-sharking operation a violation of § 1962(a) does not do violence to the basic
form of the RICO statute. However, it would still be inconsistent with the explicit con-
gressional intent to forbid infiltration of legitimate business. See text accompanying
notes 20-29 supra. The most attractive such arrangement, from a prosecutor's point of
view, would be when a Mafia "family" controls a variety of illegal activities, and the
affairs of the enterprise are conducted through a pattern of such activities, suggesting a
§ 1962(c) violation. In that case, the entire illegal enterprise (i.e., the family itself)
would be distinct from the particular pattern crimes that might be charged. Thus, no
problems of double jeopardy or duplicativeness would be presented. Furthermore, this
seems to be the type of organization Congress sought to attack with the RICO statutes.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76-78. Accordingly, in this type of situation, a
literal reading of the statutory term enterprise might not be inconsistent with what is, in
this particular case, a somewhat ambiguous congressional intent.
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the "enterprise" under subsection 1961(4) of RICO must be separate
from "the pattern of racketeering activity" or the "collection of an
unlawful debt." Thus, the Sixth Circuit is correct in its holding in Sut-
ton that the "enterprise" must be something different from the "pattern
of racketeering activity," but the courts of appeals in other circuits are
correct in their conclusion that the affected enterprise need not be a
legitimate or even ostensibly legitimate business.' 14
2. Governmental Agency as the "Enterprise"
The second problem raised by the definition of enterprise is whether
it may encompass a governmental entity; that is, whether one can be
prosecuted under subsection 1962(c) for conducting the affairs of a
government office through a pattern of racketeering activity. The
definition of enterprise could arguably include a state as a "legal entity,"
but a consideration of the rest of RICO, as well as the legislative
114. The problem arising from the tendency of the courts to allow the various ele-
ments of a RICO offense to be combined instead of requiring each element to be proven
separately is further illustrated by the case in which a corporation is a defendant-a
growing trend in the federal enforcement effort. See United States v. Marubeni America
Corp., No. Cr 78-1060 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1979); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134, 137-39 (N.D. Ga. 1979). If corporate representatives bribe two Korean officials in
connection with the acquisition of a new subsidiary plant in that country, there is an
arguable § 1962(b) violation. (This assumes that the bribes of the foreign officials may
be found to be violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), under the
theory adopted by the court in United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646-47, 651-53 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (deprivation to citizens of city of "honest
and loyal services of a public official" constitutes fraud within meaning of § 1341).) The
corporation is a "person" within the definition of § 1961(3) ("'person' includes any indi-
vidual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property"), and the
new subsidiary is the "enterprise" that is being acquired through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. Subsection 1962(b) prohibits any "person" from acquiring an enterprise that
is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activities.
Accordingly, the corporation as well as the corporate officials may be guilty of a § 1962(b)
violation, and the subsidiary may be forfeited under § 1963.
But suppose the corporation bribes the Korean officials in order to ensure that the
Korean government will purchase $10 million worth of the company's product. Initially,
this appears to be a § 1962(c) violation, which provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in ... interstate...
commerce, to conduct ...such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). The corporation is clearly being operated
through a pattern of racketeering activities. However, if the corporation is the defend-
ant, it must be the "person" performing the illegal acts under § 1962(c). But, if the cor-
poration is the "person," then what is the "enterprise"? It is important for the courts to
realize that the "enterprise" must not be the same as the corporate defendant and that
some separate entity must be involved if a corporation is to be a defendant under RICO.
The necessity of separating the "enterprise" from the defendant, whether the defend-
ant is a gambler or a corporation, is made clear by this example, because if a corpora-
tion has operated itself through a pattern of racketeering activities, what is forfeited
under § 1963? Nothing less than the entire corporation While the courts have had no
difficulty finding that a gambling business operated through a pattern of gambling
activities should be forfeited, they may balk at ordering forfeiture of a General Motors or
an Exxon when such a corporate enterprise is operated through a pattern of illegal
activities.
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history, 115 indicates that such a construction is not an appropriate inter-
pretation.
Section 1962 forbids "any person" from performing the specified acts
of acquiring or operating an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.116 "Person" is defined in subsection 1961(3) as "any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."!1 7
Assume, as in United States v. Mandel,"" that the person charged is a
state governmental official and the enterprise charged is the State of
Maryland.11 9 Obviously, the official, while capable of holding an inter-
est in property, is not capable of holding any interest in the property in
question-the state. 120 More importantly, it is obvious that the indi-
vidual cannot invest in the state in violation of subsection 1962(a) or
acquire any interest in the state in violation of subsection 1962(b). Nor,
by the same token, can the individual forfeit any personal interest in the
state under sections 1963 and 1964.121 The only possible application of
RICO is to allege that the individual "conducted the affairs of the State
"through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful
debt" in violation of subsection 1962(c).1 22
The court in Mandel rejected this argument, noting that the gen-
eral thrust of RICO, as discussed above, was aimed at infiltration of
legitimate businesses and the divestiture of interests in such businesses. 23
115. The Senate Report expressed a desire to prevent infiltration of "legitimate
organizations," which might be thought to include governmental agencies. However,
when the Report spelled out what was meant by "legitimate organizations," it spoke
about commercial life and anticompetitive effects in such a way as to indicate that pri-
vate business was being referred to. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76-77. The only
mention of the problem of corruption of governmental agencies occurred in reference to
title VIII, where Congress noted that gambling profits are frequently used to corrupt
government officials. Id. at 74-75.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
117. Id. § 1961(3).
118. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), affd and remanded on rehearing, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979), discussed at notes 123-24, 279-84 infra and accompanying text.
119. Mandel, the Governor of Maryland, was charged with accepting bribes in
exchange for promoting favorable legislation for certain race tracks in the state. Id. at
1003-04.
120. While this section might refer only to a general capability to hold property, that
was apparently not the intent of Congress. The section analysis states: "Subsection (4)
defines 'enterprise' to include associations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative
entities. Thus, infiltration of any associative group by an individual or group capable of
holding a property interest can be reached." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
56 (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 4032; see SENATE REPORT,
supra note 30, at 158. While the Report does not specifically say "capable of holding a
property interest in that group," that seems to be the congressional intent.
121. Section 1964 provides for civil remedies to seek recovery for injuries caused by
the defendants' violation of section 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
122. Id. § 1962(b).
123. 415 F. Supp. at 1020. Indeed it is quite clear that, even if Congress had intended
to do so, they could not, as a constitutional matter, have provided that duly elected or
appointed state officials must forfeit their office as a result of a state law violation. See
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 107-08 (1860); notes 20-24, 34-38 infra and
accompanying text.
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The court concluded:
The interpretation of this statute to include "states" within
the meaning of "enterprise" would clearly result in what could
only be characterized as a startling departure from the tradi-
tional understanding of federal-state relationships. Unless Con-
gress has clearly indicated its intentions to "alter sensitive
federal-state relationships," courts should be reluctant to give
ambiguous phrases within a statute that effect. 124
Notwithstanding the seemingly limited intent of Congress, several
other courts have held that governmental agencies are included in the
definition of enterprise. In United States v. Frumento'25 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an acceptable
enterprise. While the court could not point to specific language in the
legislative history to support this interpretation of the unclear statutory
language, it refused to believe that
Congress' approach to a monumental problem besetting the
country was myopic and artificially contained. Is it conceivable
that in considering the ever more widespread tentacles of
organized crime in our nation's economic life, Congress
intended to ignore an important aspect of the economy
because it was state controlled and operated? We think not. 126
In fact, Congress was well aware of the problem of corruption of
governmental officials and dealt with it in separate sections of the
Act.12 7 The fact that this problem is not mentioned as one that RICO
124. 415 F. Supp. at 1021. The court cited Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971). Rewis interpreted the federal Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), which forbids
interstate travel with intent to "promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion" of gambling operations. In Rewis petitioners operated a Florida lottery that
attracted bettors from Georgia. 401 U.S. at 810. The question was whether the peti-
tioners aided and abetted the travel of the gamblers that they invited. See id. at 808 &
n.1. While it could certainly have been argued, based on the statutory language, that
petitioners aided and abetted such interstate travel by providing its goal, the Supreme
Court rejected that argument. Id. at 811. They held that "Congress would certainly
recognize that an expansive Travel Act would alter sensitive federal-state relationships"
and concluded that Congress' failure to indicate any such intent in the legislative history
"suggest[ed]" that Congress did not intend such a broad interpretation. Id. at 812. Obvi-
ously, federal prosecution of state officials would have a far greater impact on "sensitive
federal-state relationships" than the prosecution in Rewis.
125. 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977); see notes 205-71 infra and accompanying text (dis-
cussing § 1962(d)).
126. 563 F.2d at 1091. The court seized on the congressional statement that the provi-
sions of title IX were to be "liberally construed to effectuate [their] remedial purposes"
to jstify its holding. Id. To the extent that RICO is a criminal statute, this statement is
contrary to the often repeated admonition of the Supreme Court that criminal statutes
are to be construed strictly. E.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971). Pre-
sumably, therefore, the congressional statement is only applicable to the remedial civil
portions of the statute and not to the punitive criminal provisions. Accordingly, it has no
application to this discussion.
127. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1511 (1976); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 71-74;
note 115 supra.
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sought to solve seems to indicate strongly that such was not Congress'
intent.
In United States v. Brown 128 the enterprise was the Macon,
Georgia, police department. The defendant police officers were found
to have conducted the affairs of the police department through a pat-
tern of bribe acceptance in violation of subsection 1962(c).1" The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Brown relied on the general purposes
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 as a whole in finding that
Congress intended to include governmental agencies in the coverage of
RICO, but did not consider the possibility that those purposes could
have been effectuated by one of the other nine titles of the Act.8 0
In summary, a careful consideration of the entire language of
RICO as well as its legislative history leaves the issue somewhat unclear.
However, the better solution seems to be that of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Rewis:131 In the presence of somewhat
vague statutory language and in the absence of any clear statement of
congressional intent, the safest course, and the course suggested by the
rule of lenity,13 2 is to conclude that had Congress intended to include
state governmental offices within the ambit of RICO, it would have
somewhere indicated that intention explicitly.
C. Subsection 1961(5): Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Subsection 1961(5) provides that the
"pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this Chapter and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the Com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
In the original bill, S. 1861, only a single act of racketeering activity was
required to form a pattern.13 3 The Justice Department suggested that
this definition did not seem consistent with the use of the term pattern
and recommended that the subsection be changed to its present form. 3 4
128. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
129. Id. at 412. The defendants were also convicted of a violation of § 1962(d) for
conspiring to violate § 1962(c). See notes 205-71 infra and accompanying text (discussing
§ 1962(d)).
130. 555 F.2d at 415-16. See also United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1350 n.3
(9th Cir. 1977) (San Francisco police department "enterprise" in RICO conviction). In
United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.W. Va. 1979), both the enterprise and
the defendant were the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commissioner of West Virginia. Id.
at 184. The court concluded that state agencies were included in the definition of enter-
prise. Id. In United States v. Sisk, 476 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), the court
reached the same conclusion when the Governor's office of the State of Tennessee was
the enterprise. Id. at 1062.
131. 401 U.S. 808 (1971), discussed at note 124 supra.
132. Id. at 812.
133. 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969).
134. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 122. This subsection could be read as not
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As previously discussed, 13 this subsection apparently was written to
eliminate any statute of limitations restrictions concerning the pattern
offenses, requiring only that one offense occur after the date of the
enactment of RICO13 6 and that the two offenses occur within ten years
of each other. There is no requirement that the pattern of offenses must
have any proximity to the RICO indictment.13 7
The interpretation of the meaning of the term pattern is another
area of RICO on which the circuits are divided. 138 The issue is whether
the term pattern means that there must really be a pattern in the usual
sense of the word or whether any two acts of racketeering activity, how-
ever unrelated, will suffice. A second, somewhat contradictory issue, is
whether the acts may be part of one scheme, such as two mailings in a
mail fraud scheme, or whether they must represent independent exam-
ples of wrongdoing.
1. Must the Pattern Crimes be Related?
The applicable provision in RICO is, once again, not completely
actually defining pattern, but merely setting forth the minimum requirements for a pat-
tern to be present. See United States v. Ladimer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
135. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
136. This was designed to avoid ex post facto challenges under U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 158. The courts of appeals have uniformly
rejected any ex post facto claims. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
456-60 (1965); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975). Since the
RICO violation requires an additional wrongful act after the effective date of the statute
(October 15, 1970), it seems that the ex post facto claim is not well founded. See Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977).
137. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 158. There is no speedy trial bar to such
an indefinite delay between the commission of the offense and the indictment. United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). Because RICO requires independent acts
beyond the pattern offenses, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until all the
elements of the RICO offense have been completed.
However, as the Court recognized in Marion, there is a due process consideration
in cases of pretrial delay. 404 U.S. at 324. If the pattern offenses occurred so long before
the RICO indictment that a defendant could show "substantial prejudice to [his] right to
a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over "
him, the charges must be dismissed. Id. an interesting question would arise if the last
pattern offense had taken place 20 years before the RICO indictment, but the govern-
ment had acted as expeditiously as possible to indict the defendant once he or she had
taken the final step of the RICO violation. If the defendant had not previously been con-
victed of the pattern offenses, he or she would have a strong argument that the RICO
charge should be dismissed as unduly prejudicial, despite the government's good faith,
because of the defendant's patent inability to disprove the allegations of 20-year-old
crimes. The defendant's argument might be strengthened by the fact that the govern-
ment arguably need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she committed the
crimes, but merely that there was probable cause, at the time of the offenses, to believe
that the defendant committed them, i.e., that they were "indictable" at the time they
were committed.
138. The Seventh Circuit has adopted a narrower interpretation of the statute than
the Fifth Circuit, and various district courts have decided the issue both ways. Compare
United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978) and United States
v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1977) with United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,
899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) and cases cited therein.
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clear. The term pattern itself seems to imply some relationship between
the acts. However, the definition-"at least two acts of racketeering
activity," where "racketeering activity" is "any act" (in violation of the
enumerated laws)-would seem to require no more than any two such
acts, even if totally unrelated. 3 9
Notwithstanding the implication in the definition, the legislative
history is quite definite in expressing Congress' belief that the acts must
be related. Senator McClellan, the sponsor of the bill, cited a criticism
raised by the American Civil Liberties Union that "a person could be
subjected to the sanctions of title IX [RICO] for committing two widely
separated and isolated criminal offenses.'1 40 Senator McClellan dis-
missed this criticism as "inaccurate and prejudicial.'1' He quoted the
Senate Report:
The target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infil-
tration of legitimate business normally requires more than one
"racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to
be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship
which combines to produce a pattern. 42
Senator McClellan concluded: "So, therefore, proof of two acts of
racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a pattern .... ,,143
Despite this seemingly clear-cut pronouncement, a majority of the
courts to consider the issue have concluded that "the two or more
predicate crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise, but
need not otherwise be related to each bther.' '144 In many cases this dis-
tinction will be of no importance. If the enterprise is a discrete opera-
tion such as a trucking business, two acts of racketeering in futherance
of such business are likely to be related to each other as well. 45 But, in a
139. See note 144 infra.
140. 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 158).
143. 116 CONG. REC. at 18940.
144. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). Similarly in United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
the court held:
There [is] no requirement that the two acts be related to each other ....
The statute simply require[s] that the person commit at least two acts of
racketeering activity within a ten year period....
[H]ad [Congress] wanted to provide for any "relatedness" [it could have
done so] .... [T]he term "pattern," when used in this context, applies to
the relationship of the acts to the enterprise, and no more.
Id. at 782; accord, United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-59 & n.7 (D. Conn.
1975) (interpreting United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) as tacitly supporting this view). See also United States v.
Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Contra, United States v. Weatherspoon,
581 F.2d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
145. See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1975).
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case such as United States v. Elliott14 6 where the enterprise is amor-
phous-comprised of nothing more than a series of essentially uncon-
nected illegal acts1 47 -the requirement of "relationship to the affairs of
the enterprise" is largely meaningless and does not establish a pattern in
any comprehensible sense. If the term pattern is to have any meaning, it
should have some greater content than mere relationship to this type of
enterprise.
Even where the enterprise is a discrete operation, legal or illegal,
complications can arise. Suppose the defendant is an "enforcer" who
collects debts for a gambling operation. Since everything he does in con-
nection with his employment is illegal, at least insofar as it furthers a
conspiracy, merely showing illegality and the connection to the gam-
bling business is not enough to establish the necessary "continuity plus
relationship," which is what Congress indicated that the term pattern
meant. If on one occasion the enforcer collects a debt from a "client"
and a year later beats up another client who is unable to pay, this is not
a pattern of activity, even though both acts relate to the gambling busi-
ness. It is "sporadic" activity of the sort that, according to the Senate
Report, was not covered by RICO.
1 4 8
On the other hand, if the enterprise is a business being appropri-
ated by racketeers in violation of subsection 1962(b), it is much easier to
see the pattern that the Senate was referring to. Threatening one person
and beating up another person a year later in connection with an
attempt to take over a particular business does suggest a pattern, even
though the acts are not closely related in type or time. "Continuity plus
relationship" is established by the fact that the two acts lead to a com-
mon goal that RICO was specifically designed to prohibit-the takeover
of a business.
In fact, the government itself has taken the position that the term
pattern must have greater content than simply the commission of any
two of the listed crimes. In United States v. StofSky 1 49 the government
proposed, and the court adopted, the following test to establish a sub-
section 1962(c) violation:
a. that the defendant committed two or more of the underly-
ing criminal offenses.
b. that those offenses were committed in the course of his
employment by the enterprise in question.
c. that those offenses were connected with each other by
some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a
146. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978), discussed at notes
217-31 infra and accompanying text.
147. The court in Elliott described the so-called enterprise as "amoeba-like." Id.
897-98.
148. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 158.
149. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts.150
Similarly, in United States v. Kayel'' the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the government must prove "interrelatedness
beyond a reasonable doubt."1 5 2 While this view is not clearly mandated
by the words of the statute, it seems a sensible approach that is consis-
tent with the congressional intent.
2. Pattern Crimes as Part of a Single Scheme
The second issue is whether the pattern of racketeering activity may
be satisfied by two acts that are part of the same scheme, such as two mail-
ings in a mail fraud scheme. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit recently confronted this issue in United States v. Weatherspoon. s s
In that case, the defendant was charged with defrauding the Veterans
Administration by providing false information on the number of veter-
ans attending her beauty college. She was indicted for several counts of
mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, as well as for operating her
business through a pattern of mail fraud in violation of subsection
1962(c).1 5 4
The defendant contended that the pattern of racketeering activity
required two discrete crimes and not just two acts that were part of a
single scheme.1 55 The Seventh Circuit simply pointed to the definition:
pattern requires two "acts indictable under federal law.' 5 6 Since each
mailing is a separate indictable act, it follows that two such mailings
satisfy the definition of a pattern, at least where, as here, they are
related to each other.1 5 7
150. Id. at 613. The court in Stofsky noted that in title X of the Organized Crime
Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976)), which involves higher penalties for dangerous
special offenders, a "pattern of criminal conduct" is found if the conduct "embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or
methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events." Id. at 614. The court read the term "pattern" narrowly
because of a fear that a broad reading would render the statute unconstitutionally vague
under the Supreme Court's holding in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162 (1972). 409 F. Supp. at 614.
151. 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977).
152. Id. at 860 (relying on United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis.
1974)).
153. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
154. Id. at 599. She was also indicted for several counts of making a false statement in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). 581 F.2d at 599. Since § 1001 is not one of the
"pattern" violations listed in § 1961, those counts are not relevant here.
155. 581 F.2d at 601.
156. Id. at 601-02.
157. Id. at 602. But see United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn.
1975). In Moeller the defendants kidnapped three employees of a factory and then
burned it down. Id. at 57. The court apparently agreed with the defendants' argument
that this did not constitute a pattern as Congress intended the term:
Were the question open, I would have seriously doubted whether the word
"pattern" as used in § 1962(c) should be construed to mean two acts occurring
at the same place on the same day in the course of the same criminal episode.
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In view of the fact that the language of the statute is quite clear,
and that the Senate Report's requirement of continuity does not pre-
clude two criminal acts that occurred on the same day as part of the
same scheme, the approach of the Seventh Circuit seems correct on this
issue, although it is doubtful that Congress ever contemplated that
Arnetta's Beauty College would be caught in RICO's net, given the con-
gressional purpose to combat "organized crime." Indeed, virtually every
mail fraud case will now be a RICO violation as well, since mail fraud
usually involves more than one mailing and most mail frauds involve a
purportedly legitimate business that exists independently of the
fraudulent mailings. Yet, such a series of indictable acts-all part of a
single criminal scheme-will, in other cases, constitute exactly the sort
of situation that Congress sought to embrace with RICO. For example,
the disabling of a series of trucks on the same night in a successful effort
to take over a trucking business would clearly constitute a subsection
1962(b) violation. Because Congress would have found it extremely diffi-
cult to construct the statute to exclude the former cases and include the
latter, the matter is perhaps best left to prosecutorial discretion, as Con-
gress has apparently done.
D. Subsection 1961(6): Unlawful Debt
An "unlawful debt" is defined as a debt:
(A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in
violation of the law of the United States, a State or politi-
cal subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under
State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or
interest because of the laws relating to usury, and
(B) which was incurred in connection with the business of
gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a
State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of
lending money [at usurious rates].
The unlawful debt provision substitutes for the pattern of racke-
teering activity as a predicate to a violation of subsections 1962(a), (b), or
(c). Thus, to violate subsection 1962(c), for example, one must operate
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
lection of a single unlawful debt. The Senate Report states that section
While the statutory definition makes clear that a pattern can consist of only
two acts, I would have thought the common sense interpretation of the word
"pattern" implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes, episodes that
are at least somewhat separated in time and place yet still sufficiently related
by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activity.
Id. at 57 (emphasis original). The court then quoted the portion of the Senate Report
(that was also quoted by Senator McClellan, see text accompanying notes 141-43 supra),
emphasizing the term "continuity." However, the court ruled against the defendant
because the issue had already been decided by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). 402 F. Supp.
at 57.
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1961(6), "in effect, includes loan sharking as a racketeering activity in
connection with acquisition or conduct of a legitimate organization.' 58
Because "extortionate credit transactions"159 were already included
within the definitions of racketeering activity in subsection 1961(1), it is
not apparent, nor is it anywhere explained, why this subsection was
needed.
In the original bill, S. 1861, collection of an unlawful debt was only
mentioned in subsection (b), which related to the acquisition of a legiti-
mate business. 160 Because pattern of racketeering activity was defined in
S. 1861 as a single act of racketeering activity, 161 the inclusion of the
"collection" language served no other purpose than to make it clear that
loan sharking under state as well as federal law was included under sub-
section 1962(b), 162 although this could have been better accomplished
by simply including loan sharking in the list of state offenses covered in
the subsection 1961(1)(A) definition of racketeering activity.
When "pattern of racketeering activity" was redefined to require
two acts, the "collection" language, which now appeared in all three of
the substantive subsections, 163 became significant. For no stated or
readily apparent reason,1 64 the redefinition subjected loan sharks and
others who collected illegal gambling debts to the sanctions of RICO on
proof of a single violation, rather than proof of two violations as
required for other racketeers. Whatever Congress' reasons, it is obviously
advantageous to the government to use this subsection whenever possi-
ble, since only one predicate offense must be shown instead of two. An
examination of one case in which this subsection was used illustrates the
problems that can arise.
In United States v. Salinas165 the government indicted two defend-
ants for a violation of subsection 1962(c), charging them with operating
a gambling enterprise through collections of unlawful gambling debts.166
The district court dismissed the indictment based on the defendant's
158. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 158.
159. Extortionate credit transactions violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (1976), the federal
loan-sharking statutes. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971).
160. See note 28 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
162. Read in their entirety, 18 U.S.C. §§ 892-894 (1976) seem to prohibit the same
activities included in the "unlawful debt" language of RICO.
163. There was no congressional explanation of these changes. The SENATE REPORT,
supra note 30, at 22-23, reflects these changes, which occurred at the time that S. 1861
became title IX of S. 30.
164. There is no reason to believe that Congress considered loan sharking more oner-
ous than murder, extortion, or the other pattern offenses. Loan sharking implies a cer-
tain amount of organization and continuity that would thus render the showing of a
pattern unnecessary, but also contains these characteristics.
165. 564 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1977).
166. Id. at 689. This case again illustrates the difficulty with allowing the enterprise
to be an illegal enterprise defined in terms of the pattern activities. It is impossible to
conduct an illegal gambling enterprise other than through collection of unlawful gam-
bling debts, thus rendering the RICO provisions a meaningless tautology.
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argument that the definition of unlawful debt, as it pertained to this
case, required both that the debt be incurred in gambling activity in
violation of Texas law and incurred in connection with the business of
gambling in violation of state law. 67 Because the business of gambling
was not prohibited as such by Texas law, it followed, ipso facto, that the
definition of unlawful debt could not be met. 68
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made short work of this
claim, stating that "we must look not to 'the manner in which states
classify their criminal prohibitions, but whether the particular state
involved prohibits the . . . activity charged.' '1 169 Because "gambling"
was illegal in Texas, the court concluded that it was not necessary that
Texas have any law specifically prohibiting the business of gambling for
the purposes of satisfying the definition in subsection 1961(6).
While this resolution seems sensible, it has the effect of reading the
business of gambling provision out of the definition of unlawful debt.
Since this provision in subsection 1961(6)(B) is connected to subsection
1961(6)(A) ("gambling activity") by the conjunctive "and," such a read-
ing seems to defy the clear wording of the statute. On the other hand, to
require the government to prove that a debt was "incurred . . . in
gambling activity" and "incurred in connection with the business of
gambling" (whatever those two phrases may mean) is a meaningless
requirement that does not advance any of the purposes of RICO.
Accordingly, the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Salinas seems to make
the best of a poorly drafted statute. 170
III. SECTION 1962:171 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
A. Subsection 1962(a): Investment of Racketeering Funds
The most serious problem presented by subsection 1962(a), the
question of when the pattern crimes must have been committed in rela-
167. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976).
168. 564 F.2d at 689.
169. Id. at 691 (quoting United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 295 (1969) (involv-
ing Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964)).
170. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), defined "unlawful debt" as
[A] debt (A) which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in
part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to gambling or
usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling
or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a usurious rate.
Id. § 1961(7). In this definition the use of the conjunctive made more sense since parts A
and B are not duplicative. It says, in effect, that an unlawful debt is incurred in the
business of gambling and unenforceable under state gambling laws. However, this sec-
tion was changed to require that the business of gambling be in violation of state law,
because the collection of a debt incurred in the business of gambling in Nevada would
have violated RICO, because it is unenforceable under state law. See note 32 supra.
When Congress changed the subsection to add "in violation of the law" to both parts
(A) and (B), they apparently overlooked the fact that a debt incurred in gambling "in
iolation of the law" of a state would automatically be unenforceable, thus rendering
part B unnecessary.
171. The text of § 1962 provides:
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tion to the RICO indictment, has already been discussed.1 72 Two addi-
tional problems are examined in this part.
1. Participation as a Principal
Subsection 1962(a) prohibits the investment in an enterprise engaged
n interstate commerce of income received, directly or indirectly, "from
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal.1 1 73 The ques-
tion that arises is whether "in which such person has participated as a
principal" applies only to the "collection of an unlawful debt" or
whether it also modifies "pattern of racketeering activity." This question
is important because if the "principal" language applies only to the col-
lection of an unlawful debt, subsection 1962(a) could be held to prohibit
the investment of any monies received from a pattern of racketeering
activity, even if the recipient had not personally participated in the
racketeering. For instance, a banker or stockbroker who invests funds
entrusted to him or her by a racketeer would arguably be subject to
prosecution under subsection 1962(a).
Although the face of the statute is ambiguous, the legislative history
is relatively clear and indicates that subsection 1962(a) is limited to
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income,
in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the
control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the
members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such pur-
chase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securi-
ties of any one class, and do not confer, either in the law or in fact, the power
to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
- directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
172. See text accompanying notes 133-57 supra.
173. For the full text of § 1962(a), see note 171 supra. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)
(1976) (current version) with S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9512 (1969)
("collection" language not included; was added to current version without explanation).
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investments by individuals who have participated as principals in racke-
teering activity. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst stated
the Justice Department's position on an earlier version 74 of subsection
1962(a):
It is felt that the provisions . . .are so indefinite as to intent
as to raise serious constitutional problems. Under the language
of the subsection as presently drawn, it is not clear whether the
prohibition is aimed primarily at the person who is an active
participant in illegal enterprises or at the person who does
business with such a participant, or both. If the provision is
intended to reach the person who knowingly receives income
derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering
activity in which he did not participate, there are problems not
only of vagueness of definition but also of proof. 175
Accordingly, the Justice Department recommended adding the phrase
"in which such person has participated as a principal" after "pattern of
racketeering activity"'176 to clarify that only racketeering principals were
to be covered by subsection 1962(a). In its final form the bill added the
"collection of an unlawful debt" language between these two phrases,
but obviously this was not intended to change the modification recom-
mended by the Justice Department; thus, it is clear that subsection
1962(a) applies only to racketeering principals.
2. Due Process Consideration
Syntactical difficulties aside, subsection 1962(a) poses a serious due
process problem. The statute does not prohibit any inherently wrongful
conduct; it simply forbids the investment of certain monies in enter-
prises engaged in interstate commerce. Obtaining money in violation of
other statutes does not make its subsequent investment any more wrong-
ful. In fact, the source of the monies is not related to the harm envi-
sioned by Congress. A racketeer who purchased a business with money
obtained from a relative's estate would pose exactly the same threat of
harm as one who. used loan-sharking monies. 177
174. Kleindienst was commenting on S. 1861. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at
121.
175. Id. at 122.
176. Id. at 123. The Justice Department further recommended that the exception
concerning purchase of securities on the open market be added. Id. Both of these sug-
gested changes were adopted. Id. at 23. The term "knowingly" also has been omitted
from the final version of § 1962(a). This was presumably done, not to eliminate the ele-
ment of scienter, but simply because it was felt that anyone who had participated as a
principal in the racketeering activity would automatically "know" where the money
came from. Because this is a malum prohibitum offense, if a case arises in which this
becomes an issue, the term "knowingly" should be read back into the statute pursuant to
the dictates of the Supreme Court in Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-63
(1952). See also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 223-26 (1961).
177. The harm which § 1962 is designed to prevent was summed up in the Senate
Report:
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Subsection 1962(a) can, by reference to the terms "directly or
indirectly," be construed to cover investment of money from legitimate
sources. Suppose a loan shark received $30,000 a year from loan shark-
ing and $15,000 a year from a legally operated florist shop. 78 The loan
shark scrupulously uses the loan-sharking money to pay rent, buy gro-
ceries, and pay taxes, while using the florist shop money to invest in
other businesses. Obviously, the loan-sharking money has been used
"indirectly" to invest, because if the loan shark had not possessed the
illegally procured funds, the florist shop money would have gone to pay
bills and would not have been available for investment.
Because Congress was concerned not with the source of the funds,
but with the identity of the investor- Congress wanted to keep "rack-
eteers" out of legitimate businesses regardless of whether their money had
come directly from racketeering or had been laundered-and because
"indirectly" seems to have no other meaning, this result is probably
exactly what Congress intended. In United States v. Parness179 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that whenever receipt of funds
from racketeering plus investment in an enterprise is shown, an "indirect"
violation of section 1962 is proved without the necessity of showing that
the particular funds invested came directly from racketeering. 80
Indeed, it would normally be impossible for the government to prove
exact identity of funds used. (Nevertheless, in a case in which money
was channeled directly from a legitimate source such as a relative's estate
in to an investment in a legitimate business, the government would not be
able to establish even an indirect investment of racketeering funds and the
prosecution must fail by the terms of subsection 1962(a).)
It is apparent, therefore, that subsection 1962(a) is largely a crime
of status' 8 ' mandating, in effect, that racketeers may not invest their
When organized crime moves into a business it customarily brings all the tech-
niques of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. The
effect of competitive or monopoly power attained this way is even more
unwholesome than other monopolies because its position does not rest on
economic superiority.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76 (quoting ABA Study).
178. This was the style of Al Capone's rival Dion O'Banion whose flower arrange-
ments graced gangland funerals in Chicago for many years.
179. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). In Parness the
defendant embezzled funds from a Caribbean gambling casino. He later made loans to
the casino, allegedly with the embezzled funds and then foreclosed on the loan (thus
acquiring an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of
§ 1962(b)). Id. at 434-36. The court was undeterred by the fact that the government was
unable to prove that the embezzled funds were the subject of the loan. Id. at 436.
180. Id. at 435-38. Parness dealt with the "directly or indirectly" language of
§ 1962(b). See id. at 438-40.
181. Section 1962 does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment, as interpreted in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962),
because no "disease" or uncontrollable behavior is involved and also because it does
require some conduct, albeit legitimate conduct, beyond merely being a racketeer. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-35 (1968). But see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 457-58 (1939).
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money in enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. Racketeers are
prevented from "going straight" if they desire to give up the life of crime
and buy in to a legitimate business even if, as discussed, the funds to be
used were acquired from a legally operated business. This prohibition
impinges on a liberty/property interest protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.182 But this observation
does not end the inquiry. Given that a liberty interest is abridged by
subsection 1962(a), the question becomes whether the abridgement is
permissible.8 s Can racketeers be prevented from doing what everyone
else is entitled to do?
A racketeer is not in the same position as a convicted felon, who
can be deprived of such a fundamental aspect of liberty as the right to
vote.184 Under RICO, defendants need merely be indictable for certain
crimes to be prevented from investing their money-they need not have
been convicted.18 5 Still, if there is a rational basis for the prohibition and a
"real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained,"18 6 the
prohibition is appropriate.18 7 Certainly Congress' fear of the harm
182. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), defined "liberty" to include the right
"to engage in any of the common occupations of life." Id. at 399. See also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972), and cases cited therein. Presumably this liberty interest
would apply whether the funds were legally or illegally obtained.
183. "[Tihe fact that a liberty interest cannot be inhibited without due process of law
does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited." Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (citation omitted). See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin
W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978):
"[T]he due process clause is [not] to be so broadly construed that the Con-
gress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to sup-
press business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the
public welfare."
Id. at 107 (quoting Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)).
On the other hand, the law may not be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). When a statute goes beyond
mere economic regulations and imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of a protected
right, the relationship between state interest and the means described in Nebbia must,
of course, be even stronger. Cf. G. GUNTHER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 584 (9th ed. 1975)
(substantial restraints on state action in regulation of matters other than commercial
transactions).
184. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 42 (1974). Richardson involved an equal
protection claim, which is also applicable here, and was decided on the basis of § 2 of
the fourteenth amendment which, the court held, specifically excepted those who had
participated in crimes from the right to vote. Id. at 42, 54.
185. Under the view of the statute taken in this Article, a racketeer may not be pros-
ecuted under this subsection of RICO if he or she has been acquitted of the pattern
offenses. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text. Note, however, that RICO
requires both the investor and the funds themselves (at least "indirectly") to be "dirty,"
which weakens the racketeer's due process/equal protection claim. See notes 172-76
supra and accompanying text. Congress may more easily justify prohibiting racketeers
from investing funds obtained from criminal activities than "all funds," even though, as
noted, the evil which Congress seeks to stamp out would be equally present in any invest-
ment by racketeers.
186. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
187. The prohibition is appropriate as long as the legislative enactment does not
impinge on fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech and association. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
RICO
caused by racketeers entering legitimate businesses is realistic and is
reflected in specific congressional findings.188 Conversely, there is not a
perfect congruence between the harm sought to be prevented-infiltra-
tion of legitimate business-and the measure adopted to prevent this
harm-forbidding the investment of "dirty" money. As noted, a rack-
eteer still can infiltrate legitimate businesses by using "clean" money
from a relative's estate.18 9
Although there is not a perfect relationship, a real and substantial
relationship exists between the disease and the cure. 90 Most of the
money available to racketeers for investment will have come, directly or
indirectly, from their racketeering activities. Accordingly, RICO will
prevent racketeers in most cases from investing in, and hence from gain-
ing a degree of control over, legitimate businesses. RICO, therefore,
seems to comport with the requirements of due process.
B. Subsections 1962(b)-(c): Acquisition and Operation
of an Enterprise Through Racketeering
Subsections 1962(b) and (c) provide:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or col-
lection of unlawful debt. 1 9 1
Subsection 1962(b) does not pose the same constitutional problem as
subsection 1962(a) because it does not penalize a racketeer simply for
being a racketeer. If the racketeer uses extortion, bribery, or other ille-
gal methods (constituting a pattern of racketeering activity) to acquire a
business, the racketeer has performed, in addition to the extortion or
bribery, an additional act that affects interstate commerce and that
Congress has a legitimate interest in preventing. Unlike the prohibition
of subsection 1962(a), subsection 1962(b) does not disadvantage the
188. E.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 1-2, 76-78.
189. Furthermore, a nonracketeer can knowingly invest "dirty" money and not be
subject to RICO because he or she did not "participate as a principal" in the racketeer-
ing. See notes 173-76 supra and accompanying text.
190. For the relationship to be perfect, it would have been necessary for Congress to
have banned all racketeers from participation in interstate commerce, regardless of the
source of the funds. This would be an even greater impingement on individual liberties,
so it would be foolish to require it to attain a statutory form that is purported to further
those liberties.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(c) (1976).
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racketeer vis-;a-vis the normal citizen-nobody is entitled to take over a
business by unlawful means. 192 Similarly, as to subsection 1962(c), no
one is entitled to conduct the affairs of an enterprise by threatening to
beat up potential customers if they do not avail themselves of proffered
goods or services.
The only special problem posed in subsections 1962(b) and (c) is
the meaning of the word "through." In United States v. Nerone1 9 3 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a conviction under
subsection 1962(c) because the government failed to establish that a
trailer park, which served as a front for an illegal gambling operation,
was operated "through" a pattern of racketeering activity.1 94 The court
held that the word "through" meant "by means of"19s and found that,
although the gambling operation was run by means of the trailer park
front, the government had not shown, as it should have, that the reverse
was true -that the trailer park was run by means of a pattern of gam-
bling activities. The court implied that proof "that gambling revenues
were used by or in any way channeled in to" the trailer park would
satisfy this requirement. 96
Thus, the court held that if a legitimate business is used as a front
for racketeering activity and the racketeering money constitutes part of
the working capital of the front operation, this is enough to conclude
that the legitimate business was operated "through" the illegitimate
business. This approach seems sensible.
In United States v. Stofsky19 7 the defendant union officials had
accepted payments from certain union-shop manufacturers in return for
"looking the other way" when the manufacturers used nonunion person-
nel. The defendants were charged with a violation of subsection 1962(c)
for operating the union through a pattern of violations of the Hobbs
Act' 99 and the Taft-Hartley Act.199 The defendants contended that
RICO was unconstitutionally vague in that it failed "to set forth the
degree and intensity of the relationship required between the racketeer-
ing activity and the usual operation of the enterprise"; 203 that is, it failed
to define whether "through" meant that the alleged racketeering activity
192. Or, to take an example applicable to § 1962(c), no one is entitled to operate a
business by threatening to murder customers if they do not avail themselves of his or her
wares or services.
193. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977).
194. The court criticized the government for not using the gambling operation itself,
instead of the trailer park, as the enterprise. Id. at 839 n.3, 852. Perhaps the govern-
ment recognized the problems posed by use of the illegal operation as the enterprise,
although the appellants believed it was because the government wanted to secure a
forfeiture of the trailer park's property. Id. at 851.
195. Id. at 851 (relying on BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1652 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
196. Id.
197. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1976).
200. 409 F. Supp. at 612.
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must be "in furtherance of the enterprise," or if it need be merely not
harmful to the enterprise, or whether it "must be a vital and constant
part of the enterprise. " 201 The court held that
the statute does not define this connection by distinguishing
between predicate acts which play a major or a minor role, or
any role at all, in what might be seen as the usual operations of
the enterprise; nor does it require that such acts be in fur-
therance of the enterprise, as defendants suggest it must.
In this Court's view, the statute fails to state these
requirements because Congress did not intend to require them
in these terms. The perversion of legitimate business may take
many forms. The goals of the enterprise may themselves be
perverted. Or the legitimate goals may be continued as a front
for unrelated criminal activity. Or the criminal activity may be
pursued by some persons in direct conflict with the legitimate
goals, pursued by others. Or the criminal activity may, indeed,
be utilized to further otherwise legitimate goals. No good
reason suggests itself as to why Congress should want to cover
some, but not all of these forms; nor is there any good reason
why this Court should construe the statute to do so. It plainly
says that it places criminal responsibility on both those who
conduct and those who participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, without regard to
what the enterprise was or was not about at the time in ques-
tion.202
The court read "through" as requiring some discernible connection
between the racketeering activities and the affairs of the enterprise, but
the court did not hold that the enterprise must be advanced by the
racketeering.
Thus,.the court in Stofsky concluded that although the defendants'
acts were antithetical to the union, nevertheless the defendants had
operated the union "through" their racketeering activities. 203 This
201. Id.
202. Id: at 613; accord, United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-16 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
203. Similarly, in United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), the court,
without "attempt[ing] definitive resolution" of the meaning of the term "through" found
that a union official who embezzled funds from his union was appropriately convicted of
participating in the affairs of the union through a pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of § 1962(c). Id. at 990. This approach is consistent with the legislative history
that specifically cited "theft of union funds" as one of the activities at which RICO was
aimed. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 78. In United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp.
1231, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), embezzlement of funds in connection with the travel of
delegates to a union convention was not found to be connected closely enough to the
conduct of union affairs. Id. at 1237. However, Ladmer seems to be based on
remoteness of the embezzled funds from the enterprise in question, rather than on
substantially different interpretation of the term "through."
I
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reflects the Senate's view that RICO was designed to deal with both the
destruction of the affected enterprise from within and the destructive
effect that an illegally run enterprise might have on other businesses. 2 4
C. Subsection 1962(d): Conspiracy
Subsection 1962(d) provides that "It shall be unlawful for any per-
son to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or
(c) of this section." Violation of this provision also subjects the offender
to a possible $25,000 fine and twenty years imprisonment. 20 5 This
subsection seems unremarkable at first glance and consequently escaped
the criticisms leveled at other RICO provisions. 206 Yet, this subsection
presents the most troublesome constitutional problems.
1. A New Type of Conspiracy?
The Supreme Court has traditionally taken a rather narrow view of
the scope of the conspiracy charge. In Kotteakos v. United States207 the
Court reversed the convictions of the petitioners who had been convicted
of a single conspiracy to violate certain provisions of the National Hous-
ing Act concerning fraudulent loan applications. The evidence showed
that "'at least eight . . .separate and independent groups, none of
which had any connection with each other' "20- obtained loans through
one Brown based on fraudulent information. The Court conceded that
the pattern was "that of separate spokes meeting in a common center,"
but observed that the wheel had no rim. 20 9 The Court approved the
analogy of the court of appeals to a fencing operation: "'Thieves who
dispose of their loot to a single receiver . . .do not by that fact alone
become confederates .. ,'210 In thus reversing the single conspiracy
conviction, the Court observed that mass conspiracy trials
are exceptional to our tradition and call for the use of every
safeguard to individualize each defendant in his relation to the
mass ...
Criminal they may be, but it is not the criminality of mass
conspiracy. They do not invite mass trial by their conduct. Nor
does our system tolerate it. That way lies the drift toward
totalitarian institutions. True, this may be inconvenient for
prosecution. But our Government is not one of mere conven-
204. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76-78.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). The conspiracy provision is different from the
general conspiracy statute, id. § 371, which makes it a crime to conspire "to commit any
offense against the United States." The significance of this difference is discussed at text
accompanying notes 264-71 infra.
206. See 116 CONG. REC. 35212 (1970) (letter from ACLU).
207. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
208. Id. at 754.
209. Id. at 755.
210. Id.
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ience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, in his
being afforded our historic individual protections, including
those surrounding criminal trials.211
While the Court in Kotteakos also based its decision in part on the
intent of Congress, it seems clear from the above language that the deci-
sion had a constitutional basis as well - apparently the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment 212 and the sixth amendment right of
accused individuals to be confronted with the charges against them. 213
Thus, even if Congress had made it clear that a connection with one
individual was enough to render all actors guilty of a single conspiracy
under the statute, it is apparent that the Kotteakos Court would have
reversed the convictions.
Kotteakos was distinguished in Blumenthal v. United States,214 in
which the convictions of coconspirators involved in a single whiskey-
selling scheme were upheld despite the fact that many of the con-
spirators did not have contact with others. The chain conspiracy was
approved because all defendants were involved in a single scheme, knew
they were involved in that scheme, and knew they were "aiding in a
larger plan. '215
Notwithstanding the Court's early reservations concerning con-
spiracies expressed in Kotteakos, the desirability of conspiracy charges
from a prosecutor's point of view216 has caused the government to push
at the outer limits of the doctrine in a continual effort to expand it. In
United States v. Elliott217 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded that Congress, by virtue of RICO, had breathed new life into
conspiracy law and created a new type of conspiracy-the "enterprise
conspiracy." 218 This notion, entirely unsupported by the legislative
history or the words of the statute,21 9 represents a substantial expansion
of the already broad preserves of conspiracy doctrine and further
exemplifies the desire of the courts to deal sternly with racketeers, even
if accurate statutory construction must be sacrificed.
Elliott involved six defendants, who, along with thirty-seven unin-
211. Id. at 773.
212. Id. at 763, 765.
213. The Court observed that "we do not think that either Congress ... or this Court
[in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)] intended to authorize the Government to
string together, for common trial, eight or more separate and distinct crimes ... ." 328
U.S. at 773. In Berger the Court had upheld a conspiracy indictment in the face of a
challenge based on these two provisions of the Bill of Rights. 295 U.S. at 82.
214. 332 U.S. 539, 547-48, 558 (1947).
215. Id. at 559.
216. Judge Learned Hand called conspiracy the "darling of the modem prosecutor's
nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925). See generally P.
MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CONSPIRACY CASES (1978) (discussion of various
procedural advantages to prosecutor in using conspiracy charge).
217. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
218. Id. at 902.
219. See text accompanying notes 9-40 supra.
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dicted coconspirators, committed a series of unrelated crimes over a six-
year period. While all the defendants lived in the same area and appar-
ently knew each other, they did not form any agreements beyond those
required to commit each individual crime. 220 Each crime involved one
or more defendants, but no crime involved all of them, nor was any one
of the defendants involved in every crime charged. Most of the crimes
involved two or three participants and were of great diversity, including
arson, murder, thefts from interstate shipments, and narcotics offenses. 221
There was no pooling of resources or profits from crime to crime or any
organization of the entire group. The defendants were convicted of the
various substantive offenses as well as of violations of subsections 1962(c)
and (d). The "enterprise" was defined as the group of individuals who
associated to commit the various crimes. 222 Because the crimes affected
interstate commerce, it followed that the activities of the enterprise
affected interstate commerce. 223
In dealing with the conspiracy count, the court discussed Kotteakos
and Blumentha 224 and concluded that, under those cases, the RICO
conspiracy count could not have been upheld. 225 However, because of its
findings that the sanctions available to the government in the fight
against organized crime were "'unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact,"' the court in Elliott held that Congress intended to create the new
"enterprise conspiracy," which would support the conspiracy convic-
tion. 2 6
Neither the statute itself nor the legislative history demonstrate a
congressional intent to expand the scope of conspiracy law beyond that
which was previously delineated by the Supreme Court, and it is an
extraordinary feat of creativity on the part of the Fifth Circuit to
interpret a vague remark concerning unnecessarily limited sanctions as
concrete evidence of such intent. 227 Even if Congress had attempted to
create an "enterprise conspiracy," the charge, at least as interpreted in
220. See 571 F.2d at 898-900.
221. Id. at 884-94.
222. Id. at 898 n.18.
223. Id. at 897 n.16.
224. Id. at 900-01.
225. Id. at 902.
226. Id.
227. The court in Elliott observed that
Congress found that "organized crime continues to grow" in part "because the
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited
in scope and impact." Thus, one of the express purposes of [RICO] was "to
seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by establishing new penal provi-
sions and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies .. "
Id. at 902. Nowhere did Congress indicate that these "new remedies" would take the
form of a new type of conspiracy. For example, the section analysis in the House Report
does not discuss the conspiracy provision beyond saying: "Subsection (d) makes con-
spiracy to violate (a), (b) or (c) equally subject to the sanctions [provided] below." H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 547, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4007, 4033. The Senate Report is similarly silent. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30,
at 159.
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Elliott, would have been unconstitutional as violative of the double
jeopardy clause and principles enunciated in Kotteakos. The enterprise
in Elliott was a series of unrelated criminal acts and was the same as the
"pattern of racketeering activity." Thus, the RICO conspiracy was a
conspiracy to commit a series of criminal acts by means of (the same)
series of criminal acts. And how was the agreement to be shown? By the
commission of the same series of criminal acts. The Elliott court created
two new federal crimes-a subsection 1962(c) RICO violation and a sub-
section 1962(d) RICO conspiracy-from nothing more than a series of
simple statutory violations. The element of agreement, necessary to dis-
tinguish the conspiracy charge from the substantive offense, is missing.
Proof of the substantive offense automatically makes out a conspiracy,
according to the court, because one of the elements of the substantive
offense, the pattern, satisfies the agreement element of the conspiracy. 2 s8
In addition, the problem of Kotteakos, that the wheel had no rim, 229 is
present in Elliott.230 Indeed, in Elliott it is even difficult to say that the
wheel had a hub. It is nothing more than a series of unconnected
spokes. The conspirators in Elliott had less to unify them in a common
scheme or plan than had the defendants in Kotteakos. Nor is a chain
conspiracy present as in Blumenthal. There is no simple scheme and
therefore no knowledge by defendants that they were participating in
such a scheme.
The absence of any such unifying element meant that the defend-
ants in Elliott who, for example, stole meat from an interstate shipment,
were tried for conspiring to violate RICO with those accused of arson,
even though the meat theft occurred two years after the arson and was
entirely unrelated. Thus, the expansion of conspiracy law declared by the
Elliott court is in no way suggested by the language of the statute or its
legislative history and contains serious constitutional flaws. 23'
2. Conspiracy to Engage in Nonwrongful Conduct
Beyond the problems raised by the Elliott23 2 interpretation, subsec-
tion 1962(d) has additional flaws. The necessary definition of a RICO
conspiracy-an agreement to violate a substantive RICO provision-is
an unusual formulation of the conspiracy violation. In a normal con-
spiracy the conspirators agree to do an illegal act, such as rob a bank, 233
228. This violates the double jeopardy clause under Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 305 (1932).
229. 328 U.S. at 755.
230. 333 U.S. at 97. See also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 456-58 (1939).
231. For an extended discussion of the flaws in the Elliott decision, see Note, Elliott v.
United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through
RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109, 123-26 (1979).
232. See text accompanying notes 217-31 supra.
233. The illegal act need not be criminal, but may be subject to civil penalties, as in
antitrust violations. See United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 529 (1921). In some states,
the act conspired to need not be illegal, but merely immoral, although the validity of
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from which they will derive a benefit. Establishing the existence of a
conspiracy, an inchoate offense, depends on a showing of an agreement
to perform a complete offense 234-bank robbery-before the conspiracy
offense can be established.
A RICO conspiracy is different because the predicate offenses,
subsections 1962(a), (b), and (c), are themselves incomplete 2SS-they do
not define any wrongful behavior unless the two pattern offenses are
independently proved. Rather, these subsections forbid the otherwise
legitimate behavior of purchasing and operating enterprises engaged in
interstate commerce. Thus, the conspiracy is now two steps removed 36
from the only inherently wrongful activity discussed in the statute. 2s"
The question of whether inchoate crimes can be infinitely pyra-
mided, each adding an additional punishment for the unsuspecting
offender, has never been directly confronted by the Supreme Court.238
An analysis of the question depends on an understanding of the pur-
such provisions is questionable. See P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 2.06 (1)-(2) (1978).
234. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 460 (1972).
235. The offense is not inchoate in the usual sense of the term, that is, that the con-
duct made criminal is "designed to culminate in the commission of a substantive
offense" but has failed to do so. Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate
Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation,
and Conspiracy (pt. I), 61 COLUM. L. REv. 571, 571 (1961). The conduct prohibited by
RICO is defined only by reference to another offense, but is not "designed to culminate
in the commission" of that offense. Thus, the term "incomplete" is used instead of the
term of art "inchoate."
236. That is, an agreement to acquire an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce
through a pattern of lawful activity is obviously not evil. It is only when it is acquired
through a pattern of other crimes that the statute has any effect, and the other crimes
must be independently shown. Thus, § 1962(a) is a step removed from inherently
wrongful behavior and a RICO conspiracy is two steps removed from this type of
behavior.
237. Some of the predicate offenses listed in § 1961(1) are themselves conspiracies, see
18 U.S.C. § 892(a) (1976), or otherwise inchoate offenses, see id. § 1952. Thus, a RICO
conspiracy may be even a further step removed from actual substantive wrongdoing.
Furthermore, there is no statutory prohibition against charging a conspiracy to violate,
say § 1952, while using the same § 1952 violations as predicates for a RICO charge and a
RICO conspiracy charge.
238. The courts of appeals have had no difficulty approving multiple convictions for a
substantive RICO count as well as for a conspiracy to commit the substantive offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. CIemones, 557 F.2d 1247, 1254 (5th Cir. 1978), modfied on other grounds, 582 F.2d
1373 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
There is support for the notion that a conspiracy charge cannot be too far removed
from the evil sought to be protected against, at least when a free speech interest is
involved. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1957). See also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). But these cases clearly rely on protection of free speech
and not on an analysis of conspiracy law in general.
The courts of appeals have approved similar pyramiding of incomplete offenses in
other types of cases. Thus, convictions for each of numerous interstate trips to further a
single unlawful activity (18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)) as well as conspiracy to violate § 1952
have been approved. United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 896-99 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Browning, J., concurring), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). See also United States v.
Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972).:
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poses underlying conspiracy law.23 9 It has been long established that it is
permissible to inflict dual punishment for a substantive offense and for a
conspiracy to commit that offense; they are separate crimes. 240 The
reason for this was explained in some detail in Callanan v. United
States:24
1
[C]ollective criminal agreement -partnership in crime-pre-
sents a greater potential threat to the public than individual
delicts. Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the
criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the
probability that the individuals involved will depart from their
path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes
often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends
more complex than those which one criminal could accom-
plish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to
the particular end toward which it has embarked. Combina-
tion in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unre-
lated to the original purpose for which the group was formed.
In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not con-
fined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of
the enterprise. 242
The sociological assertions contained in the above and similar passages
have been questioned, 243 and the imposition of multiple sentences for
conspiracy and the completed offense has been criticized. 244 Indeed, the
239. To the extent that conspiracy law serves the function of imposing criminal sanc-
tions on preparatory activity, see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975)
(conspiracy charge added to charge for completed crime), its function and value is
obvious.
240. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1975); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1958).
241. 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
242. Id. at 593-94 (footnote omitted).
243. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959):
Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a romantically indi-
vidualistic ring, they have never been verified empirically. It is hardly likely
that a search for such verification would end in support of Holdsworth's sugges-
tion that combination alone is inherently dangerous. This view is immediately
refuted by reference to our own society, which is grounded in organization and
agreement. More likely, empirical investigation would disclose that there is as
much reason to believe that a large number of participants will increase the
prospect that the plan will be leaked as that it will be kept secret; or that the
persons involved will share their uncertainties and dissuade each other as that
each will stiffen the others' determination. Most probably, however, the factors
ordinarily mentioned as warranting the crime of conspiracy would be found to
add to the danger to be expected from a group in certain situations and not in
others; the goals of the group and the personalities of its members would make
any generalization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for treat-
ing conspiracy as a separate crime in all cases.
Id. at 414 (emphasis original) (footnote omitted).
244. See Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189,
197-98 (1972); Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405,
414 (1959).
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authors of the Model Penal Code concluded that such multiple
punishments were unjustified in the case of a conspiracy to commit a
completed crime:
When a conspiracy is declared criminal because its object is
a crime, we think it is entirely meaningless to say that the
preliminary combination is more dangerous than the forbid-
den consummation; the measure of its danger is the risk of
such a culmination. On the other hand, the combination may
and often does have criminal objectives that transcend any
particular offenses that have been committed in pursuance of
its goals. In the latter case, we think that cumulative sentences
for conspiracy and substantive offenses ought to be permissible
.... In the former case, when the preliminary agreement does
not go beyond the consummation, double conviction and sen-
tence are barred. 245
To the extent that the criminal law is designed to deter crime, it
presupposes that the potential criminal engages in a rough calculation,
weighing the potential benefits against the chance of getting caught
times the likely punishment. The system is supposedly constructed so
that the negative balance outweighs the positive and thus discourages
crime. If the chance of getting caught is diminished by the participation
of either an inside contact at the bank or a getaway driver, it is justi-
fiable for society to increase the likely penalty for bank robbery to ensure
that the balance will not shift in favor of commission of the crime.
Thus, contrary to the assertion of the Model Penal Code authors,
imposition of an additional penalty for concerted activity has a deter-
rence justification independent of the penalty for the completed crime.
However, in the case of the getaway driver, for example, the evil
arises not from the conspiratorial agreement, but from the driver's
actual participation in the crime. If a getaway driver agrees to help a
bank robber but fails to show up, society has not suffered. 246 Indeed, the
robber, left without the planned means of escape, is probably less likely
to rob the bank than if he had planned the crime alone in the first
place. Yet, under current conspiracy law, the robber who nevertheless
proceeds alone with the robbery is subject to an additional five-year
penalty24 7 for having agreed with the fainthearted driver to commit the
bank robbery.
245. Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt. II), 61
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 960 (1961) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(l)(b) (Tent. Draft
No. 5 (1956)).
246. It is, of course, possible to materially facilitate a crime through advice or
encouragement, not merely through participation. But the getaway driver who fails to
arrive can in no sense be thought to have facilitated the crime.
247. The fainthearted driver is also subject to an additional penalty. Under current
conspiracy law the failure of the driver to appear at the bank would not, without more,
constitute withdrawal from the conspiracy and, even if the driver was found to have
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Clearly, in the case of a completed crime, the only time coconspira-
tors wrong society is when they materially facilitate2 4 the commission of
the crime in some way; or, to put it another way, when the coconspira-
tors aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure the commission of
the crime. This familiar language is from 18 U.S.C. § 2, which forbids
not conspiracies, but aiding and abetting and provides that the aider
and abettor is punishable as a principal. Curiously, despite the fact that
the evil posited in Callanan2 49 has actually occurred in the aiding and
abetting situation, no additional punishment is prescribed for the prin-
cipal actor.
Thus, conspiracy law, as it is currently construed, punishes con-
spiracies because of the purely mystical belief that to conspire is evil,
despite the fact that the evils enumerated may not have occurred in the
case under consideration. The more sensible approach is not to abolish
conspiracy charges for completed crimes, 250 but to provide that a prin-
cipal who has been aided and abetted in the commission of a crime is
subject to additional punishment. 21
withdrawn, the principal could still be found guilty of the conspiracy. See Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912); P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION & DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 2.07 (1978). A common occurrence in conspiracy cases is
that one of the conspirators is arrested before the object of the conspiracy can be
attained. This, standing alone, does not entitle a defendant to a directed verdict on the
issue of withdrawal. United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1301 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934 (1977).
248. It is obvious that despite the well-settled principle that an aider and abettor is
not the same as a coconspirator, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1954);
United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 897 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975), the distinction has no foundation, other than in statutory language, in the
case of a completed crime. Technically, no proof of agreement is necessary to show
aiding and abetting, but the acts required to show a violation for aiding and abetting
will always be enough for the jury to infer an agreement or concerted action to commit
the crime. Thus, it is impossible to aid and abet a completed crime without also being
guilty of conspiracy. Separate punishment for aiding and abetting and conspiracy,
therefore, should be considered a double jeopardy violation. The only conspirator who
does not aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), the
crime is the "fainthearted driver"-a conspirator who agrees to assist in the crime but,
for some reason, does not. As discussed in the text, the fainthearted driver should not be
considered a conspirator.
249. See text accompanying note 241 supra.
250. The Model Penal Code abolishes conspiracy charges for completed crimes. See
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of the Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute-Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt. II), 61
COLUM. L. REv. 957, 960 (1961). The merger of the conspiracy into the completed
offense was the traditional rule, but the rule existed for different reasons that are here
put forth. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1961).
251. Under this formulation, aiders and abettors would not be subjected to double
punishment for the identical acts of conspiring to commit a completed crime and aiding
that crime. Similarly, principals would not be punished for conspiring with someone who
did not facilitate the crime. However, as opposed to "contemplated concerted criminal
activity," "concerted criminal activity," which obviously does subject society to greater
risks in most cases and is the evil the conspiracy laws actually seek to prevent, United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975), will be subject to additional punishment.
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Given that conspiracy or agreement to commit a completed crime is
not an evil in itself, it follows that conspiracy to commit an incomplete
crime, such as is provided for in RICO, is also not an evil in itself. The
evil lies in the completed crime. Conspiracy is legitimately punishable
not because it is evil, but because it may reasonably be expected to lead
to evil or to facilitate the doing of evil deeds. Accordingly, when the
deeds are not themselves evil, the conspiracy should not be a crime
unless the conspiracy includes the independent harm of people know-
ingly agreeing to violate the law-a harm legitimately punishable in its
own right.
Do subsections 1962(a), (b), and/or (c) proscribe inherently wrong-
ful conduct? Certainly subsection 1962(a) does not; all it forbids is the
investment of ill-gotten gains. To whatever degree society may have
been disadvantaged by the original racketeering activity, it is not harmed
further by investment of the proceeds. Congress apparently believed that
society was disadvantaged because the racketeers would misuse the
legitimate businesses in which they invested. 25 2 This analysis is undoubt-
edly accurate, but irrelevant to the question. To the extent that racke-
teers, after they have acquired a new business, may engage in extortion
or other crimes to advance their business interests, they violate other
laws. Similarly, if the racketeers engage in securities or bankruptcy
fraud, their conduct may be, and frequently is, otherwise prohibited.
But subsection 1962(a) forbids any investment of "dirty money" in enter-
prises engaged in interstate commerce because of the speculation that
some investments may be misused. Obviously, the potential for misuse
depends not on whether the funds invested were derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity, but on whether the individual involved is a
racketeer, even if the funds came from a purely legal source. Thus,
subsection 1962(a) does not forbid any inherently wrongful conduct, but
merely conduct that Congress feared might later lead to harm. 253
When a conspiracy to violate such a statutory provision is con-
sidered, the statutory scheme becomes particularly difficult to justify.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Feola254 held that one could be
convicted of conspiracy to assault a federal officer without being aware
that the assaulted individual was in fact a federal officer. However, the
Court's decision was specifically based on the recognition that the
substantive offense of assault was an inherently wrongful act, and that
the defendant who knowingly committed that act possessed sufficient
mens rea to violate the conspiracy statute as well. 2"5 The Court left open
the question, posed by a conspiracy to violate subsection 1962(a), of
252. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 76.
253. See text accompanying notes 172-90 supra (discussion of § 1962(a)).
254. 420 U.S. 671 (1974).
255. Id. at 692. The Court rejected the reasoning of United States v. Crimmens, 123
F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941), that one must be aware of the federal jurisdictional aspects
of the crime to be convicted of conspiracy to commit the crime (but not necessarily to be
convicted of the substantive offense).
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what the necessary mens rea may be when the substantive offense is not
itself wrongful. 256 The traditionally accepted answer, first proposed in
People v. Powell,257 is that the conspirators must have knowledge that
the contemplated acts violate the law. 28 This answer makes sense when
applied to a subsection 1962(a) conspiracy, because the only possible
harm to society in a conspiracy to perform harmless acts stems from the
fact that such conduct is nevertheless illegal (here, because Congress
feared a potential later harm). Society can rightly punish its members
for agreeing to commit criminal violations, even though the actors may
feel that the proscribed conduct should not be a crime. However, if they
violate subsection 1962(a) inadvertently, with no actual or constructive
knowledge of its existence, it may be fair to convict them of the substan-
tive violation, but analytically impossible to justify an additional convic-
tion for agreeing to violate the statute. Unlike the situation in Feola, the
defendants are not on notice that their conduct is wrongful. 259
The above argument applies to conspiracy to violate subsection
.1962(a) charged under the general conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371).
A conspiracy charged under the RICO conspiracy provision-subsection
1962(d)-may be even more easily disposed of. Subsection 1962(d) pro-
vides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate the
provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section," in contrast to the
broader provisions of the general conspiracy statute that forbids con-
spiracy "to commit any offense against the United States. '260 While one
could be guilty of conspiring to commit the federal offense of bank rob-
bery without being aware that it was a federal offense,261 it does not
seem that one could "conspire to violate the provisions of § 2113" (the
federal bank robbery statute) without such knowledge. Thus, the word-
ing of subsection 1962(d) suggests that, in a RICO conspiracy, knowl-
edge of illegality is required- as distinguished from the provisions of the
general conspiracy statute in which only an agreement to perform cer-
tain physical acts is necessary.
Under the foregoing analysis of a conspiracy to violate subsection
(a), the "conspiracy to violate RICO" provision of subsection 1962(d)
must be read literally to require a showing that the defendants
256. 420 U.S. at 692.
257. 63 N.Y. 88, 92 (1875); see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 691 (1974).
258. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 937-40
(1959) and cases cited therein. See also Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703,
710-15 (1943). In Direct Sales the Court distinguished between engaging in free com-
merce, which is essentially what § 1962(a) forbids racketeers from doing, and engaging
in conduct which, though technically legal, was sufficiently suspicious to put the actor
on notice that he or she was involved in a criminal conspiracy. Only in the latter case
was the requisite intent established. Id. at 713.
259. Indeed, one would be unlikely to suppose, as a moral matter, that it was wrong
to buy an interstate business, regardless of one's previous occupation or the source of
one's funds.
260. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
261. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. at 684.
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specifically agreed to violate subsection 1962(a). Such an intent will be
virtually impossible for the prosecution to show, 262 and, therefore, it
follows that convictions of subsection 1962(a) conspiracies should be
largely precluded. 263
3. Conspiracy to Violate Subsections 1962(b) and (c)
The analysis of subsections 1962(b) and (c), however, is different. 264
While it is not an inherently wrongful act to invest ill-gotten gains, it
would appear to be wrongful to use racketeering activities to infiltrate
and take over a legitimate business265 or to use racketeering acts in the
operation of a business.266 Society has an interest not only in preventing
extortion, but also in preventing extortionate activities from destroying
businesses engaged in interstate commerce or in having such businesses
obtain a competitive advantage through the use of extortionate prac-
tices.
The situation presented by subsections 1962(b) and (c) is thus simi-
lar to Feola. The defendants agree both to engage in morally wrongful
conduct -extortion, which is unlike the commercial behavior in which
262. However, there may be cases in which one conspirator will testify as to an intent
to circumvent the RICO restrictions; the requisite intent would then be present.
263. There is no direct Supreme Court authority for the premise here advanced-that
conspiracy to violate a statute that does not prohibit inherently wrongful conduct cannot
be shown without proof that the actor knowingly agreed to violate the substantive
statute. However, the following passage from Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
703 (1943) is instructive:
Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist .... Furthermore, to establish
the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal .... This,
because charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling inference upon
inference, thus fashioning ... a dragnet to draw in all substantive crimes.
Id. at 711 (citation and footnote omitted), quoted in Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S.
672, 680 (1959).
Direct Sales involved a defendant mail order drug company that sold large quantities
of morphine sulphate to a physician. The Court held that the fact of the sales alone was
enough to establish the intent necessary to sustain a conspiracy conviction to sell nar-
cotics because the defendant must have been aware of the physician's intent to illegally
sell the drugs. The Court distinguished United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 2.05 (1940), in
which a defendant who has supplied "sugar, cans, and other articles of normal trade" to
a moonshiner was found not guilty of conspiracy. 319 U.S. at 711. The Falcone con-
'piracy was defective because the seller, Falcone, was charged not simply with conspiracy
with the buyer but, through the sales, of joining a conspiracy between the buyer and
others. The Court held that the requisite knowledge of such a conspiracy could not be
inferred from the mere sale of articles of normal trade. 311 U.S. at 210-11. A RICO con-
spiracy, charging as it must that defendants conspired essentially to engage in "normal
trade," would seem subject to the limitations on conspiracies expressed in Falcone and
Direct Sales.
264. This is so except insofar as the working of § 1962(d) itself indicates a higher
standard of mens tea. See text accompanying notes 254-63 supra.
265. See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975) (defendant embezzled money from one Goberman and used money to buy
out Goberman's interest in Caribbean gambling casino).
266. See United States v. Campanele, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1976) (defendants enhanced their truck unloading business by threatening
shippers with labor problems if they did not use defendants' company for shipments).
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they engaged under subsection (a), and to take over or operate a busi-
ness through a pattern of extortionate activities. They are thus "conspir-
ing to commit an offense against the United States," according to the
reasoning of Feola and the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the general con-
spiracy statute), and they could be convicted of violating subsection
1962(c) and section 371. However, it cannot be said that they are con-
spiring "to violate § 1962(c)" as subsection 1962(d) requires, unless it
can be shown that they did just that-agreed to violate subsection
1962(c), which they could not do without an awareness of the provisions
of subsection 1962(c) and an intent to violate those provisions. 267
Based on the wording of the RICO conspiracy statute as well as the
principles of conspiracy law, it would appear that actual knowledge of
the pertinent substantive RICO provision is necessary for any violation
of subsection 1962(d). Furthermore, since subsection 1962(a) forbids
conduct not inherently wrongful, such knowledge would also be required
to show a conspiracy to violate this provision under the general con-
spiracy statute, section 371. However, since subsections 1962(b) and (c)
do involve inherently wrongful activity, it would be possible to conspire
to violate these provisions under the general conspiracy statute without
proof of specific knowledge of the prohibitions. 26 8
This view of the conspiracy provisions of RICO solves an additional
problem-that of the nonracketeer participant. With regard, for
instance, to subsection 1962(a), which forbids a racketeer's acquisition
of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, with whom is the rack-
eteer likely to conspire? To be sure, other racketeers may be involved,
but if the business has heretofore been legitimate, presumably the per-
son from whom the racketeer buys will be a legitimate entrepreneur.
Under normal concepts of mens rea as applied to conspiracy law, the
businessman who accepts a reasonable offer to purchase his business
would be guilty of conspiracy if he was aware of the operative facts-
that the purchaser was indictable for two prior pattern crimes, that the
money had come directly or indirectly from such crimes, and that the
enterprise was engaged in or affected interstate commerce. 269 Knowl-
edge that he was forbidden by law to sell to such a person would be
267. Since § 1963(a) provides for 20 years imprisonment for violations of § 1962, as
opposed to five years under § 371, it is sensible that Congress required a greater degree
of scienter for violation of the former provision. While Congress may have felt that the
substantive RICO provisions required harsher penalties, a conspiracy to violate RICO is
no more harmful to society than a conspiracy to commit extortion, because, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961),
the harm of conspiracy is unrelated to the harm of the substantive offense. Accordingly,
there is no justification for punishing a RICO conspiracy more harshly unless it involves
a higher level of scienter.
268. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 270-71 (1952) (defendant "must
have had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a
conversion").
269. The rule in Feola is that "a conspiracy to commit [an] offense is nothing more
than an agreement to engage in the prohibited conduct." 420 U.S. at 687.
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unnecessary. But Congress clearly never intended to include dry cleaners
and truckers who receive favorable offers for their businesses within the
coverage of subsection 1962(d), even if they know that the purchaser is a
racketeer. It is thus consistent with the obvious congressional intent that
such a businessman, before he can be convicted under subsection (d),
must know that he is agreeing to violate subsection 1962(a), (b), or (c)270
when he contracts, pursuant to a reasonable offer, to sell his business to
a racketeer. 27 '
IV. SUBSECTION 1963:272 CRIMINAL PENALTIES
A. What Interests are Forfeitable?
Subsection 1963(a) provides for up to twenty years imprisonment
and a $25,000 fine for violation of any provision of section 1962, plus
the forfeiture to the United States of
270. If the businessman knows the racketeer plans to use the business for illegal pur-
poses, under the reasoning of Feola he would perhaps be guilty of the § 371 conspiracy
to violate RICO, even if he was unaware of the RICO prohibitions. See text accompany-
ing notes 254-55 supra.
271. Of course, the businessman could not be convicted under subsections (a), (b), or
(c) himself because those provisions apply only to racketeers. But is is not necessary to be
a racketeer to violate subsection (d). See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976).
272. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976) reads:
§ 1963. Criminal penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source
of influence over, any enterprise which he has established[,] operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining
orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited
to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any
property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall
deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize
the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited
under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper.
If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value
by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted per-
son. All provisions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the pro-
ceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for
violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of
compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to
forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of
this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other
person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs laws shall
be performed under this chapter by the Attorney General. The United States
shall dispose of all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
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(1) any interest [the defendant] has acquired or maintained in
violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of,
claim against or property or contractual right of any kind
affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he
has established, operated, controlled, conducted or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Forfeiture of an individual's property as a consequence of a criminal
conviction in an in personam proceeding was not an available punish-
ment prior to the enactment of this subsection. 273 However, Congress
asserted that this new approach would "remove the leaders of organized
crime from the sources of their economic power. Instead of their posi-
tions being filled by successors no different in kind, the channels of com-
merce can be freed of racketeering influence. ' 274
There are certain practical problems in applying this subsection,
notably the question of exactly what interests are forfeitable. In United
States v. Rubin275 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
the case of an individual who had operated certain union offices
through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of subsection
1962(c). The question was whether a union office was within any of the
interests section 1963 provided would be forfeitable. The court found
that since the union official held his office pursuant to a contract, he
had a contractual right under section 1963 that was subject to forfeit-
ure.
2 76
As previously discussed,277 it is impossible to apply RICO to a state
official if the enterprise in question is an arm of the state government.
273. See United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977):
Unlike in rem forfeiture proceedings against contraband or articles put to
unlawful use, § 1963 operates against the person of the defendant and includes
within the punishment for his crime forfeiture of a portion of his estate. Such a
provision, while known to the common law of England and the colonies, is
foreign to the federal criminal law. The 91st Congress recognized that, in pass-
ing § 1963, it was partially repealing a statute passed by the First Congress,
which in its present form provides that: "No conviction or judgment shall work
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."
Id. at 991 n.15.
274. SENATE REPORT, supra note 30, at 80.
275. 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977).
276. Section 1963(a) provides for forfeiture to the United States, which is obviously
not possible in the case of a union office. However, as the court observed, § 1963(c) pro-
vides for this contingency by stating that a forfeited interest "not exercisable by the
United States shall terminate." 559 F.2d at 992 n.18. The Rubin court also observed that
the forfeiture provisions
can have no proper effect on appellant's right in the future to seek union office
.... That right ... is not something appellant as an individual has acquired
or maintained [in connection with the RICO violation] . . . ; it is the same
right possessed by all members of all unions . . . . The language of the new
penal statute does not extend to such a right.
Id. at 992-93. But see 29 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1976) (providing for barring of union offi-
cials from future office holding). Furthermore, § 1964(a) provides for "prohibiting [the
defendant] from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in ..
277. See text accompanying notes 115-32 supra.
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Even if the office could be found to be an interest or contractual right
within the terms of 1963, it would violate the most basic principles of
federalism for Congress to declare that a duly elected or appointed state
official must be removed from office under a provision of federal law. 278
Clearly, Congress had no intention of so providing.
B. Procedures for Forfeiture
In United States v. Mandel 79 the court considered the govern-
ment's application for a temporary restraining order pursuant to subsec-
tion 1963(b) 280 to prevent defendants from divesting themselves of their
assets during the pendency of their RICO trial.281 The court observed
that a prerequisite for a temporary injunction is "a showing that the
petitioner will be likely to prevail on the merits at trial."282 The court
concluded that such a pretrial finding in a criminal case would be
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.28 3 Furthermore, the
hearing on the issue would present the defendants with the dilemma of
choosing between defending themselves against the allegations at the
preliminary proceeding, and thus having their statements used against
them at the trial itself, or of essentially conceding the government's
allegations of participation in activities that would later be the essence
of the criminal trial. Accordingly, the court denied the government's
petition. 2 4
Defendants could largely thwart the purposes of RICO by divesting
themselves of the asset in question after indictment and later buying it
back with the retained funds. 285 It thus seems that the court has put too
fine a point on the prerequisites for a preliminary restraining order. In
view of the explicit provision for such orders in subsection 1963(b), the
court would be justified in issuing the order on the strength of the
278. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 677 (1978);
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1861).
279. 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
280. Section 1963(b) provides that the courts may "enter such orders or prohibitions...
in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section,
as it shall deem proper."
281. Pursuant to F. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2), the indictment alleged "the extent of the
interest or property subject to forfeiture." See 408 F. Supp. at 681.
282. 408 F. Supp. at 682 (citing 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04[1] (1979)).
283. Id. at 683. Contra, United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
284. 408 F. Supp. at 684. Actually, since Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968), this dilemma probably no longer exists. Simmons forbade the government to use
testimony in a pretrial suppression hearing against the defendant at trial. Id. at 394.
While Simmons vindicated fourth amendment rights not involved here, the "fair play"
principles of the case seem equally applicable, and the government would likely feel that
Simmons effectively precluded any later use of pretrial hearing testimony.
285. RICO does not require forfeiture of money earned from racketeering, but only
the defendant's interest in the affected enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). It is
incumbent on the government to make sure that the asset does not change its form during
the pendency of the litigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976).
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indictment 28 6 plus some showing by the government of a danger of
divestiture, notwithstanding the more stringent requirements for such
an order in normal civil practice. If the government were not required
to make a preliminary showing of the defendant's likely guilt, the court
would be absolved from having any finding inconsistent with the pre-
sumption of innocence, and the problems posed in Mandel would be
eliminated.
Some additional situations involving subsection 1963 must be con-
sidered: Suppose a defendant made $100,000 through a pattern of
extortion activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The defendant
invested $50,000 in a trucking business and put $50,000 in the bank.
Because, as was argued previously, 287 the series of extortionate activities
cannot constitute the enterprise, the enterprise in question is the trucking
business and only the $50,000 invested in that business is forfeited.
Now suppose that ten years have passed since the investment in the
trucking business, which has operated legitimately over that period of
time. Defendant's interest is now worth $300,000. How much is to be
forfeited? Apparently the entire $300,000 since "any interest" and not
"any funds invested" is what subsection 1963(a) provides should be the
subject of the forfeiture. On the other hand, the income or profits that
defendant has derived from the enterprise (as opposed to the value of
the defendant's "interest") would not, under the terms of the statute, be
subject to forfeiture. 288
More difficult questions arise in considering corporate misconduct.
Suppose that corporate officials of one branch of a major national con-
glomerate bribed two local officials in connection with the acquisition of
a plant in Chicago. According to the definitions in subsection 1961(3), it
is possible for a corporation to violate RICO. 289 Thus, two RICO viola-
tions have been made out against the conglomerate. First, the con-
glomerate acquired the Chicago plant through a pattern of racketeering
286. The use of an indictment constitutes a finding of probable cause by the grand
jury. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.02[2][c] (1979).
287. See text accompanying notes 78-114 supra.
288. A federal district court recently so held in a case in which the government urged
that all profits derived from an illegally operated pornography business should be
forfeited. United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142-44 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Similarly,
in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., CR No. 78-1060 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1979),
the court held that "interest" did not include income to a corporation from the sale of cer-
tain telephone cables, which income was allegedly acquired through a pattern of
racketeering activity. This approach is sensible. The statute is not designed to punish
racketeering, but to prevent racketeering from infiltrating other businesses. It follows that
the statute should not be interpreted, in defiance of its clear language, to deprive
racketeers of their income, but only of the interest they have acquired in other enterprises
(or of their interest in an enterprise conducted by means of racketeering). In certain
cases, it may be difficult to separate interest and income, but that does not appear to have
been a problem in these two cases.
289. A corporation is an "entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976).
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activity in violation of subsection 1962(b). Second, the affairs of the con-
glomerate branch were conducted through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of subsection 196 2 (c).
Under the forfeiture provisions of subsection 1963(a)(1), the con-
glomerate would be required to forfeit "any interest ... acquired ... in
violation of § 1962"-the new plant. Furthermore, under subsection
1963(a)(2), the conglomerate would be required to forfeit "any interest
in . . . any enterprise which [it] has . . . conducted . . . in violation of
§ 1962"-the entire corporate branch!290 If the conglomerate were
AT&T and the branch were Western Electric, one suspects that Con-
gress might be encouraged to rethink RICO.2 9 '
V. CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that, although RICO was designed to
deal with infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, the stat-
ute, as written, has a much broader application. Any business or indi-
vidual committing two pattern offenses may be guilty of "racketeering
activity" under RICO. The courts, reacting to a national fear of
organized crime, have further expanded the statute to read out some of
the key elements, making it possible in many circuits for the government
to show a violation of RICO by virtually anyone who engages in "racke-
teering activity," not merely those who use such activity to branch out
in to other areas. The statute also has been read as greatly expanding the
scope of conspiracy prosecutions, despite the fact that no congressional
intent to do so can be discerned either in the statutory language or in
the legislative history. Finally, the forfeiture provisions appear to allow
for massive forfeitures of otherwise legitimate corporations whose execu-
tives have engaged in criminal activity on behalf of the corporation.
The constitutional and practical problems raised by these interpre-
tations of the statute are legion. Yet RICO advances a legitimate
national goal-keeping racketeers and racketeering out of the nation's
commerce. If the government and the courts would restrict themselves
to advancing this goal instead of using the statute to prosecute corrupt
politicians, errant corporate officials, and racketeers who have no
designs on commerce at all, most of the problems discussed herein
would be minimized. If the courts, baffled by the often confusing lan-
guage of the statute (but not wanting to be seen as interfering with the
290. The only possible argument by which the conglomerate might avoid forfeiture
would be to argue that the branch was not operated "through a pattern of racketeering
activit[ies]," id. § 1962(c), because the activities were insignificant and incidental to the
operation of the branch.
291. RICO contains four additional sections (§§ 1964-1968), which deal with civil
actions, both by the government and by private citizens, in connection with RICO viola-
tions. To the limited extent that these provisions have been litigated in the courts, the
issues involved have concerned the definitions in § 1961 that have been discussed
previously. In view of this fact and the author's lack of expertise in civil matters, a discus-
sion of these sections has been omitted from this Article.
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patriotic war on racketeering) allow the government to expand the stat-
ute beyond the reach intended by Congress, the end result may be that
the Supreme Court will strike down major portions of RICO as unconsti-
tutional, thus thwarting the operation of the statute entirely.
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APPENDIX
1961. Definitions.
As used in this chapter-
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B)
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224
(relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473, relating to coun-
terfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the
act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relat-
ing to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce,
robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia),
section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections
2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections
2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing-with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating
to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving bank-
ruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufac-
ture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law
of the United States;
(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or posses-
sion of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof;
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
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this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity;
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in
gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States,
a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under
State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest
because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in
connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the
United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of
lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or
Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable
rate;
(7) "racketeering investigator" means any attorney or investigator
so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of
enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter;
(8) "racketeering investigation" means any inquiry conducted by
any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether
any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any
final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United States duly
entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter;
(9) "documentary material" includes any book, paper, document,
record, recording, or other material; and
(10) "Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of the
United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, any
Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee of the
Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of
the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the
powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any depart-
ment or agency so designated may use in investigations authorized by
this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the
investigative power of such department or agency otherwise conferred by
law.
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person
has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in
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the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be
unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the
purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of
an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not
confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors
of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
51963. Criminal penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any inter-
est he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2)
any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual
right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise
which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section,
the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions,
including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory perform-
ance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to
forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as
the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not
exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire,
and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provisions of law relat-
ing to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof,
or the remission or mitigation or forfeitures for violation of the customs
laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to
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informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this
section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
thereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any
other person with respect to the disposition of property under the cus-
toms laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney
General. The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon as
commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent
persons.

